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Introduction 
 
 
Purpose 
Civil war is predominantly a “problem of the poor” (Sambanis 2002:216). While extremely rare in 
high-income countries, it is quite commonplace in poorer parts of the world (Figure 1). This pattern 
may partly be explained by the fact that civil war harms the economy, but scholars largely agree that 
the more important reason is that civil war is more likely to begin in poorer countries (Collier et al. 
2003: 53). Underpinning this view, a low level of economic development, as measured by GDP per 
capita, has been found one of the strongest determinants of civil war onset in cross-national studies 
(Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Yet, while there is considerable agreement that economic development 
is linked to a decreased likelihood of civil war onset, there is no agreement about what causal path-
ways underlie the association.  
Several pathways are conceivable partly because economic development has historically 
tended to go hand in hand with social and institutional change (Polanyi 1944; North, Wallis, and 
Weingast 2009). This makes it difficult to identify which parts of the “economic development com-
plex” (Lipset 1959:71) are causally related to intrastate peace. Two accounts have been especially 
influential in the recent literature. The first, which I refer to as the economic opportunity cost ac-
count, holds that poverty creates financial opportunity for large-scale armed rebellion because rebel 
combatants must be paid, and the cost of rebel labor is lower where people have meager opportuni-
ties in the regular labor market. The second, which I refer to as the politico-military opportunity 
account, posits that poor countries are more prone to civil war because they tend to have weak states, 
a rural settlement structure, and poorly developed infrastructure, which makes it possible for insur-
gents to carve out pockets of control where they can mobilize the resources needed to fight a war. 
Other accounts have also been suggested. Grievance arguments posit that poorer countries tend to 
have more deprived and frustrated populations – due to poverty, discriminatory governance, or other 
conditions – that can more easily be mobilized for rebellion. Finally, institutional arguments hold that 
1
 poor societies are typically marked by personalized and dispersed power, and violence is restrained 
by fragile elite agreements that can easily break down during crises.  
 When I started this dissertation project, some empirical research had looked at these argu-
ments, but much remained in terms of identifying the important causal variables and the processes 
and mechanisms that link them to civil war onset. The most widely noted finding in the cross-
national civil ware literature was therefore still poorly understood.  
 
Research Questions and Outline 
The main purpose of the dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of why poorer countries are 
more prone to civil war than wealthier ones. More precisely, it seeks to shed light on which important 
causal variables, processes, and mechanisms underlie the observed association between lower levels 
of economic development and a higher likelihood of civil war onset. To clarify, causal variables are 
observable attributes of a certain unit of analysis that affect the likelihood of an outcome – civil war 
onset in this case. Processes can be defined as sequences of events leading to some macro-level 
outcome. The onset of civil war depends on several processes, like organization-building, mobiliza-
tion, and bargaining. Mechanisms tell us how and why a variable, in a given context, contributes to a 
 
Figure 1. Incidence of Civil War by GDP per Capita Quartiles, 1980-2009 
Note: The figure shows the percent of years between 1980 and 2009 with civil war for four income categories. The 
country income quartiles are based on GDP per capita (PPP) in constant 2005$ (WDI 2010). Civil war is defined as an 
internal conflict with > 1000 annual battle-deaths and based on UCDP data (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010).  
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 particular outcome. They say, for instance, how actors influence each other, how their beliefs are 
formed, and how they make their choices.1  
These are big questions, and the dissertation does not attempt to assess every possible argu-
ment that might help answer them. It focuses mainly on the politico-military opportunity and eco-
nomic opportunity cost accounts, since they are most prominent in the quantitative literature. 
Following these accounts, I give most attention to the processes of insurgent mobilization and expan-
sion after the initiation of a violent political conflict with the government. These are not the only 
relevant processes for civil war onset. Still, they are important, because rebel organizations rarely 
start out with the capacity to give effective military resistance to the state (Sambanis 2004a:267).2 
The articles relate to different parts of the overarching question, and fill different gaps in previous 
research.  
Article I explores how within-country variations in economic development relate to civil 
armed conflict onset. Previous global studies looking at how economic development relates to civil 
armed conflict onset have used measures aggregated to the country level. Yet, some of the explanato-
ry variables that might underlie the development-civil war association, like poverty and accessibility, 
tend to vary within countries. Other possibly relevant variables, like central state capacity and politi-
cal institutions, do not. If any of the first set of variables were important, we should expect that civil 
wars tend to break out in less developed areas within countries. This article assesses this implication 
using a global, geographically disaggregated design. 
In Article II, I test more specific implications of the politico-military opportunity and the eco-
nomic opportunity cost accounts at the country level. In previous cross-national research, GDP per 
capita has been used as a proxy for very different variables: state capacity and reach (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003) or economic opportunity cost of rebelling (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Yet, little evi-
dence has been provided to support either interpretation.  This article develops more specific indica-
tors of state reach and economic opportunity costs, and assesses whether these variables could 
plausibly be underlying the development-civil war association.  
While cross-national analyses of civil war onset are useful for identifying plausibly relevant 
explanatory variables, they offer little insight into the processes leading up to civil war. In order to 
grasp these processes and their links to development-related conditions, I collect and analyze fine-
                                                 
1 This conceptualization is closely related to that of Falleti and Lynch (2009:1143, 1147).    
2 I discuss exceptions to this in the concluding section.  
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 grained data from the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, which turned into a civil war claiming more than 
13,000 lives.  
Article III uses empirics from Nepal to develop theory about how and where insurgencies 
over central government emerge and spread within a country over time. A general proposition is that 
the dynamics of insurgency depend on the relative military capacity of the belligerents. I derive 
several hypotheses from this starting point. Most relevant for the overall dissertation, I suggest that 
rebel activity should tend to emerge in less accessible areas when the rebels are militarily far weaker 
than the state. This follows from politico-military opportunity accounts. However, I hypothesize that 
the relationship between inaccessibility and insurgency is a contingent one: as the rebels gain military 
strength, inaccessibility should become less important, because stronger rebels have less need to hide 
from state forces.  
Article IV takes a deeper look at the processes and micro-level mechanisms of the politico-
military opportunity account. The key to the survival and growth of insurgency is the ability of rebels 
to carve out controlled “base areas”, according to prominent politico-military opportunity accounts. 
The main reason, they suggest, is that control spurs local collaboration by making threats of punish-
ment and promises of protection credible. Yet, even in remote areas, it is very difficult for militarily 
weak rebels to establish control, since a stronger state can transfer forces to rebel-affected zones. 
How, then, can weak rebels survive and gain strength? This article explores this puzzle through a 
fieldwork-based study of insurgency processes in a hamlet within the epicenter of the Maoist insur-
gency in Nepal.  
The articles are described in more detail later in this introduction. Below, I turn to defining 
central concepts. Next, I provide a broad review of the existing literature, also discussing new studies 
appearing over the course of the dissertation work. Then I briefly present the overall mixed-methods 
design of the dissertation and outline each article. Some overall conclusions are then drawn by look-
ing at the findings of all the articles in combination. Finally, I suggest some directions for future 
research.    
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 Central Concepts 
Civil War and Insurgency 
There is no clear consensus about what constitutes a civil war. Most definitions agree that it involves 
armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between government-affiliated 
forces and one or more non-state organizations (Gleditsch et al. 2002:618-619; Kalyvas 2006:17; 
Small and Singer 1982:210). Yet, these criteria do not unequivocally distinguish civil wars from 
other forms of collective violence. For this, additional, disputed criteria are needed, which typically 
concern the scale of violence, the degree of organization of the non-state actors, and the level of 
violent resistance given by the non-state actors (Sambanis 2004b:815-816). In practice, a major 
distinction between operational definitions is the choice of fatality thresholds. The much-used 
UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset separates between “minor armed conflicts”, which claim be-
tween 25 and 999 yearly deaths in battles, and “wars”, which see at least 1,000 yearly battle-deaths. 
This dissertation, like many other studies, does not use such a strict definition of civil war. Article I 
includes all UCDP/PRIO internal armed conflicts but sometimes refers to them as civil wars. Article 
II focuses on larger-scale armed conflicts, since those are most relevant for the two specific argu-
ments it assesses. Accordingly, it uses a higher threshold of violence in its operationalization of civil 
war onset. The articles based on empirics from Nepal also refer to civil war as a condition of inten-
sive political violence, but they do not rely on a strict operational definition, since they focus on the 
continuous process by which insurgency grows and spreads over time. 
Insurgency can be defined as an armed rebellion in which the rebels rely primarily on irregu-
lar warfare, tending to avoid decisive battles with government forces and rather engaging in hit-and-
run attacks using light weapons (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The dependent variable in Article III, 
insurgency onset, is defined as the beginning of rebel activity that includes lethal violence in an area 
within a country.3    
 
The State, State Capacity, Reach, and Control 
Most scholars agree that the state basically consists of a set of administrative, policing, and military 
organizations formally headed by a government with internationally recognized authority within a 
limited territory. However, some argue that the concept must be reserved to organizations in which 
                                                 
3 A low-level threshold of five days of lethal insurgent violence within a half-year period is chosen, since I am not con-
cerned with the intensity of violence, but the beginning of armed rebel activity.  
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 the formal government in fact controls the state apparatus, is relatively autonomous from societal 
groups, enjoys a monopoly of (legitimate) violence, and implements decisions through an imperson-
al, rule-based bureaucracy (Chabal and Daloz 2006:226-245; Nettl 1968). These scholars follow 
Weber in emphasizing “empirical statehood”, as opposed to “juridical statehood”, which merely 
necessitates international recognition (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). I apply the broader juridical con-
ceptualization. Rather than distinguishing between degrees of statehood or “stateness”, I conceptual-
ize important differences between states mainly in terms of different state capacity or reach. Both 
concepts are related to what Mann (1984:113) calls infrastructural power: “[…] the capacity of the 
state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout 
the realm.”4  
For some purposes it can be useful to distinguish between different types of “infrastructural” 
state strength. A state’s economic, coercive, and administrative capacity need not fully overlap (Ev-
ans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985:352), and its power may not be equally distributed across its 
territory. It may have high central capacity, but limited reach into rural areas. State reach, in turn, 
consists of two aspects: First, the presence of state agents and institutions throughout its inhabited 
territory, and second, the ease by which the state can project power throughout its territory. The 
opportunity for the state to project power to a specific area is referred to as “accessibility” in what 
follows. 
I follow Kalyvas’ (2006:111) definition of control as “the extent to which actors are able to 
establish exclusive rule on a territory”, as well as his operationalization, which focuses on the mili-
tary presence of an armed organization and its ability to prevent other armed organizations from 
operating in an area. Importantly, the term refers to local military power and not the degree to which 
organizations actually obtain collaboration by the civilian population (which is to be explained). 
 
 
                                                 
4 This concept of capacity is separated from the state’s autonomy from society.  Mann (1984:113) refers to the latter as 
“despotic power”: the extent to which state elites can make decisions without routine consultations with civil society 
groups. Clearly, it is possible to have high infrastructural power but low despotic power, as in most present-day capitalist 
democracies.  
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 Existing Arguments  
Arguments that are potentially relevant for explaining the association between poverty and civil war 
abound, and all of them cannot be discussed here.  This overview concentrates on four types of argu-
ments that are prominent in the literature.5 
 
Economic Opportunity Cost of Rebelling 
After the Cold War, many scholars and journalists argued that the nature of war has changed, and in 
the contemporary “new wars”, rebels tend to be hardly distinguishable from criminals (Kaplan 1994; 
Mueller 2004). Simultaneously, some economists built general models of rebellion and civil war 
based on the idea of “rebellion as crime”, in which greed rather than grievance motivates rebel com-
batants (Collier 2000; Grossman 1999). Later influential work by Paul Collier and colleagues aban-
dons the assumption that rebels are always motivated by greed, and rather explains civil war by 
pointing to what makes large-scale armed rebellion financially feasible (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009). In this framework, poverty makes rebellion viable mainly be-
cause it reduces the economic opportunity cost of becoming a rebel combatant.6 In Collier and Hoef-
fler’s (2004:659) words, “[r]ecruits must be paid, and their cost may be related to the income 
foregone by enlisting as a rebel”. A central implicit assumption is that individuals freely decide 
whether to spend efforts on fighting or production based on maximization of expected private eco-
nomic utility. When opportunities in the regular labor market are low, the supply of rebel labor in-
creases, which in turn reduces the costs of forming and maintaining a rebel army. 
One objection to this argument has been that poverty would reduce the cost of hiring soldiers 
for the government as much as for the rebels, given the economic recruitment logic (Fearon 2008). If 
the ratio of belligerents’ forces determines the potential for civil war, the level of income might 
therefore not matter. However, it could be that rebel organizations are more sensitive to labor costs 
than governments, since they often use more labor-intensive technologies of warfare. Moreover, 
government revenues might increase more than proportionately with income levels, thereby indirect-
                                                 
5 Additional arguments are discussed in a review of the literature on poverty and conflict that I have co-authored with 
Håvard Hegre (Hegre and Holtermann 2012).   
6 Notably, in the latest version of the theory, the authors suggest that military feasibility of rebellion could provide an 
additional link between low levels of economic development and civil war, since poor countries tend to have lower state 
capacity and control (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009:4).  
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 ly benefitting the government (Collier 2000:849). The argument therefore does not appear to be 
easily dismissed on logical grounds alone. 
 
Politico-Military Opportunity for Insurgency 
Other influential accounts of the poverty-civil war nexus highlight the political and military opportu-
nities for oppositional groups to challenge the government through insurgency. Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) argue that rebels, because of their initial military inferiority to the state, must be able to hide 
from state forces while mobilizing. Whether this is feasible depends foremost on the state’s police 
and military capabilities and the reach of state institutions into rural areas, they argue. Where states 
have a weak presence, the rebels can establish pockets of control, or base areas, which helps them 
mobilize resources and hinder information flows to state agents (Fearon and Laitin 2003:76).7 This 
argument builds on Kalyvas’ (2006) theory of control and collaboration during civil war, which holds 
that most people learn to prioritize security over other values in wartime.8 Control can therefore 
effectively spur collaboration by giving credibility to threats of sanctions against individual defectors 
and promises of protection of collaborators.9   
Kocher (2004) applies a similar logic, but argues that the opportunity for insurgency depends 
primarily on settlement patterns rather than state capacities. Only in rural societies where a large 
proportion of people live in scattered settlements can weak insurgents assume control over significant 
settlements, which allows them to extract information, manpower and material resources from local 
populations, he argues. Fearon (2008) similarly emphasizes that “social terrains” characterized by 
rural settlements poorly connected by roads and communication networks favor insurgency. 
 
Grievances and Rebel Support  
Mass discontent is often claimed to be a central ingredient in civil wars (Gurr 1970; Regan and Nor-
ton 2005). Although what sparks grievances may vary according to cultural norms of justice and 
                                                 
7 Fearon (2008) argues that the predominantly agricultural economy of poor countries also favors rebellion, since immo-
bile assets tied to the land are possible to tax through house-to-house visits, the typical insurgent method of taxation. Boix 
(2008), on the other hand, argues that abundance of immobile assets increases the chance of political violence by increas-
ing the benefits of violent expropriation and the stakes of political contestation.   
8 Kalyvas’ theory was made known through articles and working papers years before the publication of his book in 2006. 
9 Although coercion and protection is emphasized, Kalyvas (2006:124-131) suggests five additional mechanisms by 
which control may produce collaboration: socialization and information monopolies “mechanically” shaping allegiances; 
credibility of rule in the short and long term; the provision of benefits to collaborators; monitoring and population con-
trol; and self-reinforcing dynamics. 
8
Holtermann
 rightful entitlements (Gurr 1970:13), it is plausible that various conditions typical for poor countries 
often produce discontent and frustration. Some suggest that poverty directly spurs discontent (Gurr 
1970:131), while others point to factors like patron-client structures associated with local exploitation 
and social immobility (Richards 2005), governmental favoritism and discrimination of ethnic or 
regional constituencies (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011), and a general shortage of public 
goods provision (Taydas and Peksen 2012).   
The most common objection to grievance accounts of rebellion stems from Olson’s (1965) 
free-rider problem of collective action: even if people support a rebel movement, they have incen-
tives not to participate if such participation is costly, their participation is unimportant for the out-
come of the struggle, and the gains from rebellion are public goods (Tullock 1971). Yet, the free-
rider problem does not apply if grievances cause emotions like aggression or rage, which make peo-
ple behave irrationally (Gurr 1970:326). Also, politicized grievances could make people enjoy taking 
part in rebellious action, which amounts to a private good (Wood 2003). Moreover, participation in 
rebellion may not necessarily be costly in economic (Popkin 1988) or security terms (Kalyvas and 
Kocher 2007); this depends on individual and local circumstances and the strategies of belligerent 
organizations. 
 
Institutional Sources of Inter-Group Violence 
Another category of arguments holds that economic, political, and social institutions typical for poor 
countries can give both incentives and opportunities for rivaling elites to resort to political violence. 
Such arguments come in various forms. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) hold that economic 
development tends to go hand in hand with the transition to an “open access” order characterized by 
rule of law, open access to organizations, and a state monopoly of violence. Under this social order, 
violence is avoided through state deterrence. Societies that have not made this transition, “natural 
states”, are built around limited access to organizations, which underpins the creation of economic 
rents to elites within a “dominant coalition”.10 In such systems, control of coercive means is dis-
persed, and violence is controlled through fragile elite agreements. Yet, there is always a risk of civil 
                                                 
10 This order may co-exist with formal institutions of democratic participation and elements of legal-rational bureaucracy, 
according to the authors. They suggest that only about 25 countries are open access orders today (North, Wallis, and 
Weingast 2009:xii). 
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 war; especially during political or economic crises, when the terms of the agreements must be rene-
gotiated.11  
Mousseau (2012) makes a related argument that poorer countries are more prone to civil war 
because they tend to have a “clientelist” economy, marked by reciprocal and personalized exchange, 
rather than a “market-capitalist” economy, with impersonal and contractual exchange. A clientelist 
economy produces a strong separation of in-groups and out-groups and a politics of rent-seeking for 
one’s own group, he argues. A market-capitalist economy, by contrast, makes citizens interested in 
general prosperity, peace, democracy, and impartial enforcement of laws. Insurgency cannot happen 
in market-capitalist economies, he argues, because of preferences for peace as well as insurmounta-
ble collective action problems. In clientelist economies, on the other hand, insurgency can occur 
because military capacity is dispersed among groups and strong patron-client relations within groups 
remove collective action problems. 
While such theories may point to important conditions underlying the long-lasting peace in 
most wealthy democracies, they are relatively vague on the dynamics and micro-level mechanisms 
leading to civil war in countries lacking a consolidated market economy or rule of law. In 
Mousseau’s theory, which is most explicit, some assumptions are also questionable: in particular that 
war readily follows from elite-level decisions and that there is no collective action problem of rebel-
lion within social groups.   
 
 
Existing Evidence 
Various empirical literatures touch upon the question of why poorer countries are more prone to civil 
war than wealthier ones. First, there is a large body of cross-national quantitative studies of civil war 
onset. Second, there is a rapidly growing field of quantitative studies using spatial and temporal 
variation within countries to explore conflict processes. And third, there are studies on mobilization 
and collective action during armed conflict, which tend to rely on surveys or qualitative methods. I 
discuss relevant studies within each of these literatures and point to important research gaps and 
methodological shortcomings.    
 
                                                 
11 Relatively similar arguments are made by Bates (2001, 2008), Fjelde and de Soysa (2009), and Keefer (2008). 
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 Cross-National Studies of Civil War Onset 
The questions motivating this dissertation derive mainly from the cross-national literature on the 
determinants of civil war onset. Although their definitions of civil war onset vary somewhat, most 
such studies treat civil war onset as a dichotomous variable coded by the country-year and use pooled 
cross-sectional time-series regression models to estimate how a range of explanatory variables relate 
to the likelihood of onset.12 The temporal scope varies, but very few studies go further back than the 
end of World War II. 
One of the strongest associations found in these studies, as already noted, is that between a 
higher GDP per capita and a lower propensity for civil war onset. GDP per capita has been interpret-
ed as a proxy for different variables, however. In an influential study, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
posit that it captures the economic opportunity cost of rebelling. They suggest two additional indica-
tors of economic opportunity cost – male secondary school enrollment and economic growth – and 
find both to be associated with a lower risk of civil war. Yet, GDP per capita remains negatively 
associated with the risk of civil war when controlling for these two variables (Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Thyne 2006), which could suggest that it is capturing something else.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003), in contrast, interpret GDP per capita mainly as a proxy for state ca-
pacity and reach. They test several other indicators of state weakness and opportunity for insurgency: 
newly independent state; political instability; mountainous terrain; “anocracy” (regimes that are 
neither completely autocratic nor democratic); population; noncontiguous territory; and oil depend-
ency. They find all these variables to be associated with a higher risk of civil war onset.13 Although 
this supports their theory, these measures are relatively distant proxies of central concepts like coun-
terinsurgency capacity and state reach into rural areas. Moreover, GDP per capita remains a strong 
negative determinant of civil war onset when controlling for these indicators. 
Other indicators of state capacities have been tested in recent cross-national studies. Several 
of them are based on state revenues and spending (Hendrix 2010). None of the revenue-based 
measures are found to be robustly linked to the likelihood of civil war onset across studies, however, 
and GDP per capita remains linked to civil war onset when controlling for these measures (Taydas 
                                                 
12 The explanatory variables are usually lagged by one or a few years to reduce endogeneity concerns, and conflict history 
variables are included to reduce temporal dependency. 
13 The finding that anocracies are more prone to civil war has later been questioned on the grounds that political violence 
enters as a coding criteria for this regime category in the Polity scale (Vreeland 2008).  
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 and Peksen 2012; Fjelde and de Soysa 2009).14  Fewer studies have tested measures focusing on 
counterinsurgency capacity. One very rough measure, the number of state military personnel, has 
been found negatively associated with civil war onset (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Mousseau 2012). 
Still, GDP per capita remains negatively associated with civil war onset when controlling for it. 
There has also been some research into how “social terrains” relate to the risk of civil war. 
Several studies look at population density and geographical dispersion, but they have not found a 
robust linear association between these variables and civil war onset when controlling for GDP per 
capita (Buhaug and Rød 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon 2005). The proportion of the popu-
lation living in urban areas, on the other hand, appears to be more strongly linked to civil war onset. 
Kocher (2004) finds that controlling for this variable, GDP per capita is no longer negatively associ-
ated with civil war onset. Settlement structure might therefore be one variable underlying the devel-
opment-civil war association. The role of roads and communication networks for civil war onset has 
been less studied. In a geographically disaggregated, cross-sectional study from Africa, Buhaug and 
Rød (2006) find that higher road density was associated with lower risk of armed conflict over terri-
torial issues, but had no association with the risk of conflict over central government.  
The role of institutional factors has been investigated in several recent studies.  It is well es-
tablished that the development-civil war association is not mainly due to a tendency for poorer coun-
tries to have less democratic formal institutions (Hegre et al. 2001).15 A few recent studies suggest 
that contract enforcement and protection of private property may be more important. Fjelde and de 
Soysa (2009) use the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply (“contract-intensive 
money”) as an indicator of contract enforcement. They find this to be strongly related to a lower risk 
of civil war onset, and that the GDP per capita association with civil war onset is considerably re-
duced when controlling for it. Mousseau (2012) tests a related variable, the extensiveness of life 
insurance contracts, which he interprets as a measure of the degree to which the economy is based on 
market-capitalist exchange. He finds this to have a strong negative association with civil war onset, 
and that the GDP per capita is no longer related to the likelihood of civil war onset when controlling 
for it. De Soysa and Fjelde (2010) test two other institutional indicators: the “quality of government”, 
which is based on expert assessments of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality, and 
                                                 
14 Fjelde and do Soysa (2009) find some evidence that higher government spending as a share of GDP is related to a 
lower risk of civil war onset, however; especially in regimes with high constraints on the executive.  
15 Collier and Rohner (2008) find evidence suggesting that the effects of (formal) democracy and GDP per capita on the 
risk of civil war may be contingent, however. Increasing income levels, they find, is more strongly associated with 
reduced risk of civil war among democracies than among autocracies.  
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 “economic freedom”, which captures contract enforcement, the openness of markets, and government 
non-interference in the economy. When controlling for both the “quality of government” and “eco-
nomic freedom”, they find that GDP per capita is no longer negatively associated with civil war 
onset. Generally, these studies provide support for the idea that societies with reliable third-party 
enforcement of contracts are less prone to civil war, and that this might help explain the poverty-civil 
war association. Still, the findings are consistent with a politico-military opportunity account, since 
states that credibly enforce contracts are likely to have considerable administrative and policing 
capacity, which facilitates effective counterinsurgency. 
Grievances were largely dismissed as explanations for cross-national variation in civil war 
risk by early studies on the basis that individual income inequality, democracy, and ethno-linguistic 
diversity were not found associated with civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). Subsequent studies challenge this inference. Some argue that inequalities among individuals 
are not as relevant for armed conflict as “horizontal” inequalities between culturally defined groups, 
since armed conflicts are often structured around identity groups (Stewart 2008). Several articles 
show that exclusion of ethnic groups from state executive power is related to a higher risk of civil 
war (e.g., Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Socio-
economic horizontal inequalities have also been found associated with a higher likelihood of internal 
armed conflict (Østby 2008). Although this suggests that group-level grievances matter, GDP per 
capita is still associated with civil war onset when controlling for horizontal inequalities and ethno-
political exclusion (Wimmer, Cederman, Min 2009; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). 
Another grievance argument is made by Taydas and Peksen (2012), who posit that governments can 
reduce grievances, and thereby also the risk of civil war, through welfare spending. They find that 
spending on education, health, and social security goods decreases the risk of civil war, whereas 
higher military spending and total government spending do not. When controlling for welfare spend-
ing, the GDP per capita-civil war association is weakened, but still significant in most models.   
While the above-mentioned studies use pooled time-series cross-sectional models, some re-
cent studies have taken other approaches. Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) use fixed effects mod-
els to test within-country temporal covariation between economic development and civil war 
incidence, using new estimates of GDP per capita dating back to 1825.16 They find that GDP per 
capita is no longer significantly associated with civil war when adding country fixed effects. This 
                                                 
16 Data exists back to 1825 for only 6 countries, however. Back to 1850, there is data for 27 countries.  
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 may suggest that it is not income levels per se that reduce the risk of civil war. Further, using a sam-
ple of ex-colonies and pooled models, they find that GDP per capita no longer has a significant nega-
tive coefficient when controlling for European colonial settlement. Their interpretation is that 
“historical phenomena […] jointly determine income evolution and conflict” (Djankov and Reynal-
Querol 2010:1035). However, it is not clear how European colonial settlement prevents civil war 
down the road. It could, for instance, be related to infrastructural or institutional developments that in 
turn affect the risk of armed conflict. 
Several studies take an instrumental variable approach to get around the problem of possible 
endogeneity of income and growth to political instability and violence.17 Miguel, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti (2004) use rainfall variation as an instrument for economic shocks in Africa, and find that 
decline in rainfall is associated with a higher risk of internal armed conflict onset. However, Ciccone 
(2011) shows that this finding is an artifact of their operationalization of rainfall shocks. Consistent 
with this, Theisen, Holtermann and Buhaug (2011/2012) find no association between droughts and 
civil war onset in Africa, using a geographically disaggregated design. International commodity 
prices have recently been used as an instrument for economic growth, but also for this variable dif-
ferent studies seem to reach different conclusions (Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Bazzi and Blattman 
2011). Generally, then, although short-term economic decline has been found associated with a high-
er risk of civil war in several studies (Dixon 2019:715), there is no firm consensus about the direction 
of causality. 
To sum up, the cross-national literature on civil war onset has established quite clearly that 
the poverty-civil war association is not only due to poorer countries having smaller armies, more 
autocratic formal institutions, or more vertical inequality. Various institutional differences, including 
whether governments credibly and impartially enforce contracts, may plausibly form part of an ex-
planation. So could social terrains, which may capture state reach and opportunity for insurgency. 
Whether differences in economic opportunity costs may help explain the development-civil war 
association is less clearly established.  
 
Shortcomings 
While the cross-national literature has yielded considerable insights, there are also significant gaps 
and methodological problems. First, several central explanatory variables have been proxied by 
                                                 
17 The problem is more acute for economic growth than for the level of income, which tends to change very slowly. 
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 vague and theoretically distant indicators. One such variable is the economic opportunity cost of 
rebelling. Arguably, the most relevant indicator for this concept would be income levels, but none of 
the previously tested indicators, like GDP per capita and male secondary schooling, measure this. 
Further, some single indicators of social terrains have been tested, but these do not fully capture the 
broad concept of state reach. This variable can better be measured by a composite index involving 
both social terrains and infrastructure. These measurement problems are addressed in Article II, 
which is described below. 
A second problem concerns spatial overaggregation. Previous cross-national studies compare 
country averages, even though insurgencies often take place only in limited parts of a country and 
factors related to economic development tend to vary within countries. This could result in measure-
ment error. Moreover, some hypotheses that could help us understand the development-civil war 
association cannot be tested using country-level designs, like whether armed conflicts tend to begin 
in poorer or wealthier areas within countries. Article I contributes to filling this gap by using a geo-
graphically disaggregated design to study the links between economic development and the likeli-
hood of civil armed conflict onset. 
There are additional problems related to much of this literature. First, development-related 
variables could be partly endogenous to civil war, although this problem is more acute for rapidly 
changing variables, like economic growth and political instability. More fundamentally, there are 
problems related to the lack of a clear agreed-upon definition of civil war (Sambanis 2004b). Moreo-
ver, by looking at civil war onset as a discrete occurrence, these studies are not able to capture the 
often lengthy processes leading up to this outcome. While cross-national studies are useful for identi-
fying general patterns and sorting out more and less plausible explanatory factors, other designs offer 
more leverage for analyzing the processes and mechanisms posited by theories of civil war onset.  
 
Subnational Quantitative Studies of Conflict Processes 
In response to limitations of cross-national quantitative studies of civil war onset, scholars have 
increasingly turned to subnational analyses of wartime processes. While such studies are unable to 
fully assess the causes of armed conflict, they can be useful for assessing the micro-foundations of 
theories of civil war onset. Several of the theories described above concern rebel mobilization and 
growth during armed conflict. Since data on rebel mobilization are difficult to obtain, many subna-
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 tional quantitative studies have attempted to derive implications from these theories about the spatial 
or spatiotemporal patterns of violence we should see within countries during conflict. 
Many such studies look at the association between local prewar socio-economic, geographic, 
or demographic conditions and the level of violence during armed conflict. They tend to come to 
different conclusions about the role of poverty, which is sometimes interpreted as a proxy for eco-
nomic opportunity cost (Do and Iyer 2010) and sometimes for grievances (Murshed and Gates 2005). 
Even for particular cases, like the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, studies have not arrived at a consen-
sus. Some studies find that poorer areas saw more violence (Do and Iyer 2010; Murshed and Gates 
2005) while others find no such association (Acharya 2010; Nepal, Bohara, and Gawanda 2011). In a 
study from Liberia, Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh (2009) find that fighting actually tended to be more 
intense in wealthier areas. Somewhat similarly, Berman et al. (2011) find that areas with higher 
unemployment rates tended to see less insurgent attacks against government forces in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and the Philippines. Studies also come to different conclusions about the role of accessibility 
and infrastructure, central variables in the politico-military opportunity account. For Nepal, studies 
find that remote areas with few roads and rough terrain tended to see more violence (Acharya 2010; 
Do and Iyer 2010), but for 14 Central African countries, Raleigh and Hegre (2009) find that “war 
events” (mainly fighting) were more frequent in areas connected by roads.   
A few studies have begun to explore how rebellion or violence spreads over time within a 
country (O’Loughlin and Witmer 2010; Schutte and Weidmann 2011). Do and Iyer’s (2010) study of 
the spread of rebellion in Nepal is especially relevant, since it focuses on the role of development-
related factors. They analyze how pre-insurgency district-level factors are related to the likelihood of 
early insurgency onset, operationalized as the year a district reaches 100 cumulated fatalities. Poverty 
is found to be the most important predictor of early insurgency, while roads or terrain did not play 
any role.    
Buhaug (2010) takes a different spatial approach. Using global data on the location of armed 
conflict onset collected in this dissertation project, he analyzes how prewar conditions affect both the 
risk of conflict breaking out in a country and where fighting occurs within a country. He argues that 
the location of armed confliict depends on the relative capacity of the belligerents: if the rebels are 
facing a stronger government, they are likely to focus activities in areas farther from the capital. Most 
of the findings support the argument: the conflict is more likely to begin in the periphery of countries 
with a high level of economic development, an effective state bureaucracy, and militarily weak in-
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 surgents. But seemingly contrary to the argument, a smaller government army also predicts fighting 
in the periphery.  
 
Shortcomings  
While these studies give important insights, there are also problems associated with them. In particu-
lar, studies of the intensity of violence have limitations for assessing theories about mobilization and 
collective action. First, the intensity of violence is a poor proxy for rebel mobilization or activity. 
During civil war, low levels of violence in an area need not indicate low rebel activity; rather, it 
could stem from complete rebel control and monopoly of violence (Kalyvas 2008). Second, most of 
these studies do not take into account that armed conflicts are dynamic processes, and fighting may 
move from one place to another over time. In a highly disaggregated study of selective violence 
during the Greek civil war, Kalyvas (2006) finds that the pattern of control was the most important 
explanatory factor, and that local income levels had different associations with violence in different 
time periods. Rebel activity in one place may also not only be a consequence of local circumstances, 
as is sometimes assumed; it can spread through diffusion or rebel projection of power from other 
areas.  
Looking at how insurgent activity spreads over time has greater potential for giving insights 
to the role of local factors in armed conflict. Still, existing studies, like that of Do and Iyer (2010) for 
the Nepalese case, have considerable limitations. Although this study takes a step towards capturing 
conflict dynamics, it does not include time-varying explanatory variables. The model thereby rests on 
the questionable assumption that insurgency onset in a district is independent of conflict processes in 
nearby areas and developments at the macro-level. Article III presents an analysis of the spread of 
insurgency in Nepal that addresses this and other limitations of the study.  
 
Studies of Mobilization and Collective Action  
Most of the theoretical accounts of why poorer countries are especially prone to civil war focus on 
rebel mobilization. The focus is not surprising: many rebel groups begin as militarily weak, and in 
order to fight a war, they must mobilize considerable human and material resources from the domes-
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 tic population.18 The micro-foundations of these accounts give quite different predictions for what 
mobilization dynamics we should observe. The most obvious difference lies in the motivations of 
rebel participants. While the economic opportunity cost account emphasizes private economic moti-
vations, grievance accounts highlight emotional or idealistic motivations rooted in perceived injus-
tice. Politico-military opportunity accounts are more agnostic towards personal motivations, but 
suggest that most people will not do things that strongly hamper their security.19  
Not many general conclusions can be drawn from the vast literature discussing motivations 
behind various forms of collaboration with rebel organizations. The most apparent insight is that 
expressed motivations vary considerably, usually also within specific organizations or localities. In a 
survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, a clear majority of the RUF rebels said they had been ab-
ducted, and very few mentioned other reasons for joining (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Survey 
data from Colombia suggest a variety of motivations for joining rebel as well as paramilitary groups; 
among other things, material gain, ideology, revenge, fun and adventure, and power (Arjona and 
Kalyvas 2012). Viterna (2012) finds that women guerillas in El Salvador followed different paths to 
recruitment: some joined for political reasons, often early on; others joined reluctantly when experi-
encing a material or security crisis related to government repression; while some joined for adventure 
or retribution after being persuaded by guerillas. Similarly, rebel collaborators without full-time 
engagements have been found to express different motivations, including emotional or moral reasons 
stemming from perceived injustice and political support of the rebels (Wood 2003), fear and security 
considerations (Kriger 1992; Vines 1991), and self-interest in gaining access to public or private 
goods provided by rebel organization (Popkin 1988; Young 1998).  
Generally, these studies suggest that motivations vary and that they often relate as much to 
conflict processes as to prewar conditions. This may challenge some grievance accounts, which 
assume that discontent derives predominantly from structural conditions. It also does not fit well with 
the economic opportunity cost account, which holds that people generally emphasize economic con-
siderations and that prewar poverty levels determine people’s opportunity cost of rebelling. Some 
dismiss rebel statements, however, since rebels may have reasons to conceal selfish motivations 
                                                 
18 Some rebel organizations gain considerable material resources as well as fighters from external sources (Byman et al. 
2001). Yet, even so endowed organizations, if they are of a considerable size, depend on local supplies of food, shelter, 
information, and often, part-time collaborators and new recruits.  
19 Since rebel combatants often comprise a tiny minority, these accounts tend to focus more on collaboration by noncom-
batants than on recruitment of full-time combatants. 
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 (Collier 2000). They rather suggest focusing on who the rebels are and what they do to learn about 
their motivations. 
Few existing surveys allow for comparing the backgrounds of rebel combatants with those of 
noncombatants. Yet, evidence from unsystematic comparisons as well as from the available surveys 
appears to suggest that rebel combatants tend to be poorer and less educated than the population 
average (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008:447; Viterna 2006:10; Weinstein 2007:114; Wood 
2003:222).20  The most certain finding is that rebel (as well as paramilitary) combatants tend to be 
young, and usually male (Arjona and Kalyvas 2012:151-153; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). 
Some studies also find that rebel combatants, especially in the initial phase of insurgency, tend to be 
drawn from political or social activist groups linked to the rebel cause (Petersen 2001:101-129; 
Viterna 2006:19). Moreover, several studies point to recruits often having family or friendship ties to 
rebels before joining (Arjona and Kalyvas 2012:160; Hart 1999:209), and often having relatives or 
friends harmed or killed by the opposing armed group (Arjona and Kalyvas 2012:164; Wood 
2003:223-230). Generally, however, rebel combatants and collaborators appear to come from a varie-
ty of backgrounds, although there is a tendency for some groups to be overrepresented.  
According to the politico-military opportunity account, the political and military context plays 
an important role in mobilization. Consistent with this, Arjona and Kalyvas (2012) find that rebel 
combatants in Colombia tended to come from localities with a guerilla presence. Similarly, Elizabeth 
Wood suggests that rebel participation in El Salvador was highly unlikely where the government had 
a strong presence (Wood 2003:212).  
 
Shortcomings  
The large literature on mobilization and collective action during armed conflict, which is far from 
fully covered here, is highly insightful. Still, important gaps remain. Few studies have been able to 
assess the micro-foundations of politico-military opportunity theories, for instance, which emphasize 
the role of local control for mobilization. This would require careful tracing of control and mobiliza-
tion over time at the local level, which is usually not provided in micro-level studies. Article IV con-
tributes to filling this gap through an in-depth qualitative study of insurgency processes in a hamlet of 
Nepal.  
                                                 
20 As in other political organizations, however, the leadership tends to be highly educated (Wickham-Crowley 1992:23-
25).  
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Design and Contents of the Dissertation 
The dissertation uses a mixed-methods approach to deepen our understanding of the links between 
economic development and civil war. The articles focus on different levels of analysis, ranging from 
countries to individuals, and use different methods: statistical methods, qualitative methods, or a 
combination of the two. The obvious advantage of integrating diverse designs and methods to study 
an overarching question is that every approach has its strengths and weaknesses, and tends to leave 
some questions open that can better be answered by other approaches.  
The dissertation includes two quantitative cross-national studies. They help establish general 
patterns, and point to some factors that could plausibly underlie the development-civil war associa-
tion.  However, cross-national designs have limitations for analyzing how the explanatory variables 
are linked to the complex outcome of civil war. To further explore this, I study the dynamics of the 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal. This case has several advantages: First, the country displays considera-
ble spatial variation in development-related factors, which gives leverage for comparisons. Second, 
the case is well suited for exploring the micro-foundations of the politico-military opportunity ac-
count, since initial conditions fit the theory well, and we would therefore expect mechanisms to 
adhere to the theory.   
The first Nepal study uses a mixed-methods approach to analyze the emergence and spread of 
insurgency over time. Most importantly, this allows me to explore whether the role of local factors in 
insurgency processes is contingent on the relative military capacity of the belligerents.  The other 
article provides an in-depth analysis of mobilization processes in one hamlet of Nepal. Through 
careful process-tracing and comparison over time, I am able to explore the micro-foundations of 
politico-military opportunity theory, which has not been thoroughly investigated before. I present 
each article in brief below. 
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 Article I: It’s the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion and Conflict 
Outbreak Location21 
This article constitutes, to my knowledge, the first global study of the association between subnation-
al income variations and the onset of civil armed conflict. Some of the explanatory variables suggest-
ed to underlie the negative association between economic development and civil war onset at the 
country level, like poverty and state presence, tend to vary within countries; other suggested explana-
tory factors, like central government capacity and national-level institutions, do not. If any of the first 
set of variables were important, we would expect to find that civil wars tend to break out in less 
developed areas of countries. By implication, we should see a stronger association between income 
levels and the outbreak of civil war when using subnational data than country-level data.  
We use new data coded by myself on the location of civil armed conflict onset, defined as the 
place of the first recorded battle-death in the conflict. An inclusive definition of armed conflict is 
chosen, with a low 25 annual battle-deaths threshold.22 Using Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS), the conflict onset data were merged with spatially disaggregated data on economic production 
and other variables into a grid cell structure with a resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees. The main 
advantage of this design is the spatial disaggregation on a global scale; the main disadvantage is the 
restricted temporal scope. The economic data exist only for the year 1990. We therefore look at how 
“local” economic production (“gross cell product per capita”) in 1990 relate to the risk of seeing 
onset of a civil armed conflict in the following ten-year period (1991-2000).23   
We find that areas seeing onset of conflict tend to be somewhat poorer than the national aver-
age, although the association between negative income deviations and conflict onset is not statistical-
ly significant at conventional levels. For the least developed countries, however, the results suggest 
that wealthier areas see a higher likelihood of conflict onset.24 This may suggest that the role of local 
or subnational poverty or state reach may be contingent on macro-level factors related to economic 
development, like state capacity.  Moreover, we find that areas with more forested and mountainous 
terrain see a higher risk of conflict onset, as expected from politico-military opportunity theories. On 
                                                 
21 This article is co-authored with Halvard Buhaug, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Gudrun Østby, and Andreas Forø 
Tollefsen and published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution  (Buhaug et al. 2011).   
22 This could be problematic for assessing some accounts of the development-civil war association. However, this article 
is explorative, and does not test any of the above theories in particular. 
23 The term “local” is used in an untraditional sense, since we are not looking at particular places, but relatively large, 
arbitrarily defined grid cells.  
24 The small number of armed conflict onsets in the sample makes this inference relatively uncertain, however. 
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 the other hand, conflict onset is more likely in areas closer to the capital, which appears to contradict 
such theories. This could be related to the inclusion of low-intensity armed conflicts like coup at-
tempts, however, which are outside the scope of standard politico-military opportunity accounts.   
Generally, the study suggests that the development-civil war association is at least partly 
rooted in subnational conditions. However, there are several limitations to the study. First, the limited 
temporal variation makes estimates relatively uncertain. Second, the study cannot say much about the 
processes leading to civil war and how development-related factors are linked to them. Third, the 
finding that conflicts tend to begin in areas with lower levels of economic production is consistent 
with several theoretical interpretations. The data needed to construct more precise indicators for the 
different causal variables that GDP per capita may proxy for are currently not found at a disaggregat-
ed level for the entire world. To construct such indicators and test their impact on the risk of civil war 
I turned to a country-level design.  
 
Article II: Explaining the Development-Civil War Relationship25  
This article assesses cross-national, quantitative implications of the two most influential accounts of 
the development-civil war association: the economic opportunity cost and the politico-military op-
portunity accounts. As discussed above, existing cross-national studies provide little evidence to 
assess which of these interpretations of the development-civil war association are most plausible. I 
develop more precise indicators of the explanatory variables of the two arguments, which allow for 
assessing this question. Following the economic opportunity cost logic, the poorest should be the first 
to rebel since they have the least to lose. Since rebel organizations need only a tiny fraction of the 
population as full-time rebel soldiers, the income opportunities of the poorest segment of society 
should, according to this logic, be the most important determinant of labor costs for rebel organiza-
tions. I therefore use the income of the poorest 10 percent of the population (“bottom decile income”) 
as a proxy for economic opportunity costs. The data for this indicator were compiled from two sur-
vey databases, the Luxembourg Income Study (2009) and the World Bank’s (2008) “Povcalnet”.  I 
focus on one central variable in the politico-military opportunity account: state reach. This variable is 
                                                 
25 This article is single-authored and published in Conflict Management and Peace Science (Holtermann 2012). 
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 measured by an additive index of three indicators: the density of roads and telephone lines and the 
percentage of people living in urban areas.26  
I test the impact of these variables on the risk of civil war onset in a sample covering 133 
countries from 1989 to 2006.27  The state reach indicators are all found to be strong determinants of 
the risk of civil war onset, and controlling for the state reach index, GDP per capita does not have 
any significant association with civil war onset. “Bottom decile income”, on the other hand, is not 
significantly associated with the risk of civil war onset and the GDP-civil war relationship remains 
intact when controlling for it.  
These findings suggest that the association between low levels of development and civil war 
is more plausibly related to low state reach and social terrains favoring insurgency than to the depth 
of poverty. The interpretation I suggest is that rebel mobilization and survival depends more on the 
opportunity for rebels to carve out control than on low economic opportunity costs. Where politico-
military conditions allow insurgents to establish control, they can effectively apply several tools – 
persuasion, coercion, organization and economic rewards – to mobilize resources from local popula-
tions. Although poverty may ease recruitment under such conditions, it may not be necessary or even 
important. Moreover, where the state has firm control, the risk of capture or death is likely to deter 
insurgent participation irrespective of economic considerations.     
There are caveats to these inferences, however.  The findings are made uncertain by the lim-
ited sample size and the relatively high correlation between bottom decile income and state reach. 
Moreover, even if the statistical results were indisputable, other causal accounts could be imagined. 
Lack of infrastructure could, for instance, be associated with grievances, and might offer rebel organ-
izations opportunity to gain collaboration by providing public goods. Moreover, the mechanisms 
suggested and their links to structural factors are not sufficiently established by the existing case 
study literature. To further explore this, I turned to a case study of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.  
 
                                                 
26 These indicators probably also capture central state capacities to some extent, but they are too distant proxies to say 
anything with certainty about, for instance, state military or administrative capacity.  
27 Civil war onset is coded if there are more than 500 battle-related deaths in a year or if there are more than 25 deaths in 
a year and cumulative deaths over the three subsequent years reach 1,000.  
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 Article III: Relative Capacity and the Spread of Rebellion: Insights from Nepal28 
This article analyzes the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1996-2006) in order to build theory about the 
emergence and spread of insurgencies seeking to overthrow the central government. While this arti-
cle has a broader theoretical aim, it also sheds light on the links between development-related factors 
and civil war. The central argument builds on politico-military opportunity theories, and posits that 
insurgency tends to be a highly coordinated phenomenon in which belligerent organizations strongly 
shape local processes. In consequence, conflict dynamics become contingent on the overall relative 
military capacity of the belligerents: as an initially weak rebel organization develops militarily, the 
role of local conditions for the prospects of rebellion will change due to shifts in rebel priorities as 
well as the appearance of new tools of influence. If this argument is correct, it means that not much 
can be learned by looking at associations between prewar local conditions and the intensity of vio-
lence for the entire conflict, as several previous studies of Nepal’s Maoist insurgency have done. It 
also challenges Do and Iyer’s (2010) study of the spread of insurgency in Nepal, which assumes 
stationary effects of all explanatory variables.  
The empirical analysis combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. I use qualitative da-
ta to identify key processes underlying the spread of insurgency in different phases of the conflict. 
This analysis draws on my own interviews from three districts as well as other studies, reports, and 
Maoist party documents. I find that the rebels relied considerably on pre-existing ties to populations 
in political strongholds to mobilize in the beginning. After a couple of years, mobilization in these 
areas allowed them to expand activities to nearby districts, mainly through movement of guerillas 
and political cadres.  Over time, diffusion mechanisms also helped spread the rebellion. Some people 
for instance became inspired to rebel after hearing about Maoist achievements elsewhere. As the 
rebels managed to improve their military capacity, the processes of expansion changed. The Maoists 
began to transfer large groups of combatants across regions and coercion took a more prominent role 
in mobilization efforts. Moreover, they constructed alliances with other political movements where 
they lacked a political foothold.  
Some implications of the arguments are then tested statistically, using district-level Cox dura-
tion models of insurgency onset, defined as the beginning of rebel activity that includes lethal vio-
                                                 
28 This article is single-authored and currently under review in an academic journal. 
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 lence.29  I argue that as the rebels gain military strength relative to the government, they become less 
dependent on (i) pre-existing local networks for mobilization; (ii) inaccessible areas for hiding; and 
(iii) proximity to areas with rebel presence for projecting power. We should therefore see that these 
conditions increased the likelihood of insurgency onset in the early phase of rebel weakness, but that 
their effect gradually declined over time, as the rebels gained capacity relative to the state. I use the 
percentage of district votes for the UPF, the precursor of the Maoist party, in the 1991 elections as a 
proxy for pre-existing local networks. Accessibility is measured using an equally weighted index of 
rough terrain, road density, and distance from the district headquarters to Kathmandu.30  Proximity to 
areas with rebel presence is proxied by a dummy marking whether any adjacent districts already had 
seen insurgency onset at a particular time. I test the hypotheses using interaction terms between these 
conditions and the time since the launch of the insurgency as well as two measures of relative mili-
tary capacity. The first relative capacity measure is the number of rebel full-time combatants as a 
percentage of government forces; the second is a moving average of daily government force fatalities 
over six-month periods. The results support the hypotheses: while pre-existing networks, inaccessi-
bility, and proximity to insurgency-affected areas were strong determinants of onset in the beginning, 
their effect faded over time and with increases in rebel capacity relative to the state. 
I test several other variables as well, which I do not have strong reasons to expect will have a 
temporally contingent effect. To assess the role of diffusion through mass media I include the per-
centage of the population with radios, which I find robustly and positively associated with the likeli-
hood of insurgency onset. As an indicator for poverty, I use the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which is an equally weighted index of life expectancy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita. 
HDI is negatively associated with insurgency onset, but it is not statistically significant in most mod-
els, thereby providing only partial support for economic opportunity costs or poverty-related griev-
ances being important for insurgent activity.31  
                                                 
29 Onset is coded if there were at least five days of insurgent killings within any half-year period in a district, based on 
violent events data from INSEC (2010). The main results are robust to changes in this operationalization.  
30 “Accessibility” is measured somewhat differently here than “state reach” in Article II. Since the latter focuses on 
factors that could plausibly relate to both economic development and the reach of the state, it excludes rough terrain. The 
“accessibility” index excludes urbanization, since this is not a good measure of accessibility on the district level in Nepal. 
Nearly all districts were predominantly rural, and tiny differences would therefore get considerable weight in the index. 
Telephone density is excluded mainly for simplification, since the index hardly changes when including this indicator.  
31 It is somewhat difficult to disentangle poverty from state reach also in this study, however. HDI could indicate greater 
state presence in addition to economic wellbeing. Further, it is relatively highly correlated with the accessibility index (r 
= 0.60).  
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 Overall, the study suggests that where and how insurgency spreads over time depends upon 
the relative military capacity of the belligerents. This insight may not be very surprising, but it is 
rarely taken into account in empirical studies. Politico-military opportunity accounts, for instance, 
suggest that inaccessibility generally favors insurgency (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003:80). Yet, this 
rests on an assumption that the insurgents are far weaker than the state, which does not always hold 
across conflict periods or in the initial phase of every insurgency. Further, the study shows the im-
portance in this case of a factor that is ignored in most studies of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and 
in the cross-national literature: rebel pre-existing networks and political support. The last article 
provides more insights to the role of this factor, and particularly its importance relative to patterns of 
territorial control.  
 
Article IV: How Can Initially Weak Insurgent Groups Grow? Lessons from Nepal32 
The final article looks more deeply into the processes of mobilization and growth of insurgency. It 
takes politico-military opportunity arguments as a starting point. Building on Kalyvas’ (2006) theory, 
these arguments hold that local control is the key determinant of collaboration by local noncombat-
ants during armed conflict, and that collaboration in turn is essential to rebel survival and growth.33 If 
this is so, how can rebel groups that are far weaker than the state gain strength to begin with? Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) and Kocher (2004) suggest that even if a state is stronger than the rebels, it may be 
too weak to fully control the entire polity, thereby leaving open politico-military spaces where the 
rebels can carve out base areas. However, since a very weak rebel group can hardly spread its influ-
ence widely, the state should be able to deny the rebels of base areas by transferring forces to rebel-
affected zones. A simple politico-military opportunity account therefore seems insufficient for ex-
plaining the growth of weak rebel groups.  
This study explores this puzzle by carefully tracing the patterns of control and mobilization in 
a hamlet within the core area of the Maoist rebellion in Nepal. It focuses on the period from the 
initiation of insurgency in 1996 up to 2002, when the country was undoubtedly in a state of civil war. 
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency is well suited for exploring the micro-foundations of politico-military 
opportunity theory. The country’s weak state, rural settlement structure and difficult terrain make it a 
highly plausible, or perhaps even a “most-likely” (Eckstein 1975:118), candidate for a politico-
                                                 
32 This article is single-authored.  
33 This is more clearly stated in Kocher (2004) than in Fearon and Laitin (2003), who also focus on other factors, such as 
the skills of counterinsurgent forces. Still, they explicitly draw on Kalyvas’ theory.   
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 military opportunity explanation of civil war onset. This gives reason to expect that the theory’s 
suggested causal processes would be in operation, and, if not, that the theory is imperfectly specified.  
I use Kalyvas’ (2006) detailed theory of control and collaboration during civil war as a start-
ing point.34 He argues that collaboration is largely a result of local control, mainly because control 
allows an actor to credibly threaten punishment of defectors and promise protection of collaborators. 
Kalyvas separates between “full control”, under which one actor completely prevents the opposing 
actor from operating in the area; “dominant control”, under which one actor has forces stationed in 
the area, while the opponent must operate clandestinely or only sporadically enter the area; and “pari-
ty”, where no actor is markedly stronger than the other.  Under full control, he predicts no collabora-
tion with the weaker actor. Under dominant control, a minority of highly committed individuals is 
predicted to collaborate with the weaker actor, whereas the majority collaborates with the dominant 
actor. Under parity, similar levels of collaboration with each side are expected (Kalyvas 2006:197, 
205).  
The analysis makes use of various qualitative approaches. First, I use the congruence method 
(George and Bennett 2005:181) to establish whether Kalyvas’ predictions about collaboration under 
different control zones hold in this case. Second, I draw on comparisons over time, particularly be-
tween periods under dominant government control and periods under dominant Maoist control. Third, 
I use process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005:205-213) to identify mechanisms of collaboration. 
The primary source of information is 32 in-depth interviews from Rolpa by the author, which includ-
ed Maoist combatants and cadres, non-combatant villagers, and leaders of the other major political 
parties.       
In consistence with my argument, I find that even if the state had scant presence in the field 
site before the insurgency, the rebels were not allowed to gain control easily. After the launch of 
insurgency, the government rapidly set up new police stations and assumed dominant control. In 
contrast to Kalyvas’ predictions, collaboration with the rebels was more widespread than with gov-
ernment agents in the period of state dominance, and recruitment of rebel full-timers higher than 
recruitment to counterinsurgent forces. This helped the rebels slowly gain strength during this period, 
which resulted in the police being forced out of the area in early 2000. In the following period of 
                                                 
34 Notably, it is unclear whether Kalyvas believes the theory is applicable to the early phase of insurgency that I focus on. 
He restricts the theory to civil war, but his broad definition of civil war makes it difficult to assess at what point an 
insurgency becomes a civil war. The theory is still a useful starting point since it is more detailed than related accounts, 
and has inspired politico-military opportunity theories of civil war onset. 
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 dominant rebel control, collaboration was in agreement with Kalyvas’ theory. Nearly all opposition 
faded, everyone contributed in cash or kind to the rebels, and many joined as full-timers.   
I identify two main reasons for these outcomes. First, the Maoists’ strong local pre-existing 
organizational and social networks spurred rebel collaboration and recruitment, often in spite of 
considerable personal risk. The specific mechanisms connecting networks to collaboration were 
difficult to establish, but several mechanisms are likely to have operated, including solidarity, norms 
of reciprocity, and social incentives. Second, inept counterinsurgency and the government’s incon-
sistent law-and-order approach benefited Maoist mobilization. Importantly, many Maoist supporters 
were arrested on trumped-up charges and later released by the courts.  Provided with grievances and 
often with ties to insurgents, many of those arrested joined the guerillas upon their release. The police 
also tended to rely on a few locally disliked anti-Maoist strongmen as informants, which led to false 
denunciations. Further, the police often engaged in coercive information gathering, which caused 
resentment and reduced civilians’ opportunity cost of joining the guerillas.   
Although the study points out limitations of military control, it does not suggest that control is 
unimportant for the prospects of insurgency. If the government had been able and willing to establish 
full control in these areas, the outcome might have been different. Limited state resources combined 
with scattered settlements and difficult terrain also forced the police to spread its forces thinly, which 
made them vulnerable to ambush. Still, the analysis suggests that the processes underlying the growth 
of weak rebel groups may be more complex than what is suggested by prominent politico-military 
opportunity accounts. Moreover, it points to the role of networks and to counterinsurgent policies and 
practices, not just capacity, as important topics for further research.   
 
 
Conclusion 
The dissertation’s contributions to answering the overarching question are best recognized when 
seeing the articles in combination. In the following, I discuss the inferences to be drawn from the 
articles’ findings. I also show how the insights from the Nepal studies help make sense of observa-
tions in the cross-national studies. Next, I sum up the contributions of the project to the study of civil 
war, before suggesting directions for future research.   
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 Discussion of Main Findings 
The overarching aim of this dissertation was to enhance our understanding of why civil war occurs 
disproportionately in countries with low levels of economic development. Several accounts had been 
suggested at the outset of the project, but much remained in terms of empirically identifying the 
causal variables, processes, and mechanisms producing this pattern. I have used various approaches 
to help fill these research gaps. First, cross-national, quantitative analyses were carried out to assess 
what causal variables can plausibly be driving the global pattern. Second, I analyzed insurgency 
processes in Nepal in order to develop theory about how and under what conditions development-
related conditions are connected to civil war onset.  
A central conclusion is that the state’s reach throughout the polity is an important variable 
underlying the development-civil war association. I have provided cross-country evidence showing 
that countries with greater state reach have a significantly lower chance of seeing onset of civil war, 
and when controlling for state reach, GDP per capita is no longer associated with civil war onset 
(Article II). Further, I have shown that in the Nepalese conflict, areas less accessible to state agents 
were more likely to see insurgency begin in the early years of the conflict (Article III). The Nepal 
study also suggested that the role of accessibility and state reach are contingent on the relative mili-
tary capacity of the belligerents, however. In the last phase of the Nepalese conflict, when the Mao-
ists had become able to offer considerable military resistance to the state, accessibility no longer 
mattered for where the insurgency spread. This makes theoretical sense: when the rebels do not need 
to hide from state forces, the main advantage of inaccessibility disappears.  
Most studies of civil war onset or insurgency processes do not take into account the contin-
gent role of state reach. This also applies to the cross-national analyses of Article I and Article II, 
which preceded the quantitative Nepal study.35 Reconsidering some observations in these studies that 
deviate from a simple politico-military opportunity account gives credibility to the modified account, 
however. Article I found that armed conflicts tend to begin in wealthier, rather than poorer, areas 
within the least developed countries. Since wealthier areas tend to be more accessible for state 
agents, this seemed puzzling from a politico-military opportunity perspective. Yet, the puzzle disap-
pears when taking into account that accessibility only matters under asymmetry of military power: in 
                                                 
35 Even if this contingent relationship had been theorized when these analyses were carried out, it would have been 
extremely difficult to model this using such designs. I discuss this below.  
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 the poorest countries, the state is likely to have so low capacity that even very weak rebel groups may 
not need to hide from state forces.  
Article II pointed to some outliers of civil war onset in countries of fairly high levels of state 
reach and economic development (Article II, Figure 1). The Balkan civil wars in the 1990s constitute 
a considerable proportion of them. The poor fit of these conflicts is not puzzling when considering 
that most of them were not highly asymmetric from the initiation because of the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav state (SIPRI 1992:408; Woodward 1995:250-264).36 Hence, these cases do not seem to 
challenge the core claims of politico-military opportunity theory after scope conditions have been 
properly defined. Other cases, like the civil wars in Israel/the Palestinian Territories and in the United 
Kingdom/Northern Ireland, are more difficult to account for in a politico-military opportunity 
framework. Anomalous cases are found for most social science theories, however, and the relation-
ship between state reach and civil war onset is only a probabilistic one: although unlikely, insurgency 
can occur under difficult politico-military conditions. 
My qualitative study from Nepal (Article IV) provides insight into the limitations of politico-
military opportunity arguments. Prominent scholars have emphasized that low state reach allows 
insurgents to carve out pockets of control, which is essential for their survival and growth. I show, 
however, that low state reach does not necessarily make it possible for weak insurgents to carve out 
control over significant settlements to begin with, since the state can move forces to insurgency-
affected areas. Moreover, it is possible for rebel groups to gain strength even under dominant state 
control if they have strong pre-existing local networks, which provide powerful spurs to collaboration 
and make it more difficult for state agents to exploit the benefits of control.  
While this study shows that control is not the only factor influencing the prospects of insur-
gency, it does not dispute that it plays an important role. Nepal’s Maoist rebels greatly enhanced their 
mobilization after gaining control. Control allowed them to credibly threaten punishment of defec-
tion, as emphasized in other politico-military opportunity accounts. However, it also made them 
better able to organize villagers and shape their political beliefs, which gave additional spurs to col-
laboration.  
Scattered settlements, lack of infrastructure, and limited state resources helped the Maoists 
eventually gain control. These factors forced the government to scatter its police forces thinly, which 
                                                 
36 A possible exception is the Kosovo conflict, where the Kosovo Liberation Army was militarily much weaker than the 
Serbian forces from the beginning (SIPRI 1999:50-62). Yet, support for the Kosovo Liberation Army by Albania and 
pressure against the Serbs by NATO relatively soon provided a counterbalance.  
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 made them vulnerable to rebel raids. Another possible reason for the counterinsurgency failure in the 
area could be that transferring coercive forces does not weigh up for the lack of long-lasting adminis-
trative and police presence. If state institutions were more firmly rooted in the area, the police may 
perhaps have avoided relying on coercive intelligence gathering and associating themselves with 
unpopular anti-Maoist activists.  
The dissertation does not find much support for the economic opportunity cost account, on 
the other hand. Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) argument implies that the poorest should be the first to 
join a rebel army, and that the income opportunities of this segment should be an important determi-
nant of the feasibility of rebellion and thereby the risk of civil war onset. This implication does not 
hold up well against the evidence. Article II finds that the risk of civil war onset in a country is not 
robustly related to the income of the poorest decile of society, and that GDP per capita remains asso-
ciated with civil war onset when controlling for the variable. The studies from Nepal also do not lend 
much support to this account. While there was some tendency for insurgency to begin earlier in areas 
of lower socio-economic development, this association was not robust when controlling for accessi-
bility. Moreover, in the initial few years, the poorest segment of society seemed to be underrepre-
sented among insurgent combatants; living at the subsistence level, they could not afford to spend 
their time on unpaid activism.  
This does not necessarily imply that economic opportunity costs are generally unimportant for 
the decision to become a full-time rebel. There are several other reasons why poverty may not be 
essential for explaining the potential for insurgency and civil war. First, recruits may not be the most 
important shortage for many rebel groups. Limited supplies of arms and food often restrain the de-
mand for full-time participants. Part-time participation may therefore be an equally important re-
source. Because such participation can be combined with regular work, income levels are not likely 
to be important for the decision to join. Second, poverty could also make it easier for the state to 
recruit combatants or to buy information services from noncombatants (Berman et al. 2011). Third, 
when politico-military conditions do not favor insurgency, security considerations are likely to out-
weigh economic reasons to rebel for the simple reason that money has little value if you are dead. 
Finally, as indicated above, if the rebel organization is not able to pay its soldiers, too low incomes 
may actually inhibit rebel activity since people living at the margins of subsistence must work to feed 
their families.  
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 A more sophisticated economic argument might still be plausible. It could be that rebel organ-
izations often have abundant volunteers, and therefore screen them for desired skills. If that is the 
case, the economic opportunity cost of rebelling for people with some education could be what mat-
ters the most for building a strong rebel army (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Kavanagh 2011). While this 
argument cannot be dismissed, my study from Nepal suggests that those joining the insurgency in the 
important initial period tended to do so mainly for non-economic reasons.   
The articles do not provide as much direct evidence pertaining to grievance arguments. My 
findings do not dismiss that grievances play a role, but they suggest that a direct causal chain from 
poverty to grievances to rebel collective action and civil war is not likely to be important. The Nepal 
case study suggests that the formation of grievances is often contingent on political processes. In this 
case, the strongest grievances arose from processes during the conflict; not the least, indiscriminate 
violence and unlawful behavior by the police, combined with the framing efforts of Maoist political 
entrepreneurs. Poverty and low government public goods provision did play a role in the formation of 
grievances and support for the Maoist rebellion, but such factors were insufficient for making most 
people participate in the rebellion. 
 
Contributions 
The most important contribution of the dissertation relates to the main research question of why 
poorer countries are more prone to civil war than wealthier ones. To sum up, it provides new evi-
dence suggesting that poverty per se is not the main factor explaining the association. More im-
portant factors are low state reach and accessibility, which provide opportunity for a rebel 
organization challenging a militarily stronger state to survive and grow. The dissertation also further 
specifies this politico-military opportunity account: First, state reach and accessibility are unlikely to 
be important when the rebels have considerable capabilities relative to the state to begin with. Sec-
ond, local military control does not necessarily trump all other factors in generating collaboration in 
the initial phase of armed conflict. These theoretical specifications help account for several observa-
tions left unexplained by previous versions of politico-military opportunity theory. 
The dissertation also provides more general insights into rebel mobilization and civil war. 
Many previous subnational studies of conflict dynamics have assumed that the role of various struc-
tural conditions is constant over time. Article III shows that this assumption is untenable: the condi-
tions favoring rebellion, and the mechanisms driving it, may change over the course of a conflict. 
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 The study also contributes methodologically by showing how such contingency of local factors can 
be incorporated in statistical models of conflict dynamics. 
The dissertation also contributes to the literature on the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. While 
previous quantitative studies have argued that economic factors were key drivers of the rebellion, my 
findings suggest that pre-existing Maoist networks, a factor ignored by nearly all such studies, were 
far more important in the initial phase. I also provide new qualitative data and analysis that helps 
shed light on the growth of the insurgency in Rolpa district.  
Finally, the project has involved collecting data that are of use beyond this study. Most im-
portantly, I have collected data on the location of onset for all civil armed conflicts in the UCDP 
dataset from 1946 to 2006. Somewhat relevant for the dissertation, Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 
(2011/2012) use these data to study the association between droughts and civil war onset in Africa. 
We find no such association, which is consistent with the conclusion that poverty is not a key deter-
minant of civil war onset. The data are also integrated in the publicly available PRIO-GRID dataset 
(Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012).  
 
Future Research 
Variables that are potentially relevant for explaining the development-civil war relationship abound, 
and this dissertation has not assessed all of them. For instance, it has not carefully investigated the 
role of institutional factors, which a few recent cross-national studies suggest are important. I there-
fore cannot exclude that patron-client structures, weak rule of law, or a dispersion of military power 
within the state may help explain the development-civil war association. Future cross-national anal-
yses of civil war onset that include such factors as well as indicators of state reach could perhaps 
provide further indication of their relative importance. Yet, this approach has limitations. It is diffi-
cult to take into account that the role of state reach is contingent on the relative military capacity of 
potential rebels and the state, for example. To properly do this, we would need information on the 
military capacity of potential rebel groups before armed conflict begins, which, of course, is not 
easily available.  
New approaches may hold more promise. Civil war onset is a complex outcome produced by 
several different processes. This dissertation has focused mainly on rebel mobilization and survival 
after the onset of hostilities. Yet, to reach a complete understanding of civil war, we also need to ask 
why violent rather than nonviolent forms of contestation are chosen by dissident groups and state 
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 actors in the first place and why negotiated settlements are not reached short of war. The prospects 
for insurgent mobilization and survival surely influence these processes: if dissidents expect to be 
crushed if they turn to violence, they are not likely to do so. But choices of violence depend on other 
factors as well, and require study in their own right. Even if structural factors make insurgency feasi-
ble, this does not fully explain why it is chosen. The rebels and the government could take such 
factors into consideration when bargaining over political settlements (Walter 2009a). By disaggregat-
ing these processes, analyzing each step, we may gain a more complete understanding of how various 
factors affect the likelihood of civil war. A few studies have begun to do this for “ethnic” or sepa-
ratist conflicts (Öberg 2002; Walter 2009b), but much more theoretical and empirical work along 
these lines is needed.   
Mobilization processes during armed conflict have been more studied, but gaps remain also in 
this field. This dissertation suggests that pre-existing factors, including accessibility and social net-
works, can be important in the initial phase of asymmetric conflict. More temporally disaggregated, 
comparative research would be useful for testing this claim and further specify the mechanisms 
underlying it. Moreover, my studies from Nepal point to the importance of counterinsurgency prac-
tices, and not only capacities, for understanding rebel mobilization. Studies have begun to look at the 
effect of various counterinsurgency policies on rebel activity (e.g., Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; 
Lyall 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011). Why various counterinsurgency policies are made 
and how these are turned into practice has been much less studied, and are important avenues for 
future research.  
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“It’s the Local Economy, Stupid! Geographic Wealth Dispersion 
and Conflict Outbreak Location” 
 
 
Table A1: Country Descriptive Statistics 
Country GWno 
No. 
cells 
min 
GCPpc 
max 
GCPpc 
mean 
GCPpc 
s.d. 
GCPpc GDPpc 
USA 2 4863 5559.4 62044.88 30985.35 15584.24 27951.31 
Canada 20 8030 0 67800.31 22436.01 8099 23049.89 
Bahamas 31 44 15334.62 15633.02 15412.89 59.51 15403.68 
Cuba 40 78 4023.37 4113.67 4090.24 16.48 4084.48 
Haiti 41 17 1587.59 1588.01 1587.91 0.1 1587.96 
Dominican Republic 42 29 2712.91 2717.21 2716.39 1.11 2716.97 
Jamaica 51 10 4807.54 4936.29 4863.53 43.6 4863.69 
Trinidad and Tobago 52 7 6595 6637.61 6613.24 22.75 6595.5 
Barbados 53 2 11858.8 11858.8 11858.8 0 11858.8 
Mexico 70 825 594.25 33001.28 7962.98 3821.21 7868.15 
Belize 80 11 4341.98 4494.62 4387.61 56.29 4371.64 
Guatemala 90 43 3148.65 3854.3 3528.09 191.34 3598.29 
Honduras 91 46 735.63 7974.84 2447 1275.86 2268.55 
El Salvador 92 9 3472.75 3647.09 3536.64 61.07 3504.4 
Nicaragua 93 52 1543.36 2235.69 1834.3 155.06 1853.42 
Costa Rica 94 26 4868.43 5344.51 5126.56 159.21 5158.22 
Panama 95 47 4458.49 5780.97 4691.21 295.73 4705.43 
Colombia 100 396 1400.92 21701.32 3957.93 2842.45 4244.74 
Venezuela 101 331 330.18 63451.18 8898.31 8593.57 8392.46 
Guyana 110 71 1096.31 1232.53 1194.85 44.29 1226.74 
Surinam 115 56 3576.55 23078 7990.16 2922.25 4990.92 
Ecuador 130 107 1995.16 25793.59 5939.79 5419.86 4302.63 
Peru 135 452 303.17 746957.96 9564.6 37561.53 4044.36 
Brazil 140 2932 758.56 147577.42 7248.76 10219.78 6298.46 
Bolivia 145 368 1423.17 4205.09 2643.28 700.72 2567.17 
Paraguay 150 141 816.53 3814.6 3186.94 709.51 3558.25 
Chile 155 430 48.87 87201.82 10174.78 16662.87 5562.68 
Argentina 160 1169 922.64 15431.56 4568.54 2441.8 5939.16 
Uruguay 165 75 5875.5 6247.69 5975.91 78.96 5980.07 
United Kingdom 200 217 84.77 57917.5 19192.09 9434.53 20206.92 
Ireland 205 54 6804.4 43923.92 15434.68 8956.6 14721.11 
Netherlands 210 23 17019.65 25556.95 22463.23 2062.55 23076.84 
Belgium 211 18 15975.45 26340.93 20661.28 4030.58 22827.39 
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Country GWno 
No. 
cells 
min 
GCPpc 
max 
GCPpc 
mean 
GCPpc 
s.d. 
GCPpc GDPpc 
Luxembourg 212 1 37040.48 37040.48 37040.48 NA 37040.48 
France 220 292 14342.61 36661.56 19043.18 2825.68 22414.48 
Switzerland 225 16 26182.42 32613.86 29975.47 1393.2 30492.72 
Spain 230 272 10125.6 22746.84 16201.2 3328.82 17148.5 
Portugal 235 58 6207.9 20564.67 10870.34 3019.91 12635.26 
GFR 260 135 15510.81 33513.16 22985.64 3751.85 24225.99 
GDR 265 65 10446.26 21691.72 15118.86 2404.19 16717.47 
Poland 290 174 3674.23 11875.06 6857.78 1907.73 6765.39 
Austria 305 40 16934.72 29987.27 21232.88 3593.36 23317.24 
Hungary 310 45 5833.09 14650.29 9559.59 2141.36 10819.1 
Czechoslovakia 315 62 6908.58 17096.07 11257.54 2564.87 12311.17 
Italy 325 200 2890.24 77335.23 22337.03 12688.08 21065.6 
Malta 338 2 12835.57 12835.57 12835.57 0 12835.57 
Albania 339 16 3115.25 3115.85 3115.61 0.24 3115.66 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 345 129 2730.78 24694.71 8257.98 5542.75 6927.58 
Greece 350 122 6665.62 217621.67 29541.02 31280.39 18782.94 
Cyprus 352 12 10806.49 66660.58 28103.13 19699.39 16625.64 
Bulgaria 355 50 4261.63 13478.87 6476.44 2159.1 6261.12 
Rumania 360 116 2481.02 26366.32 7728.26 3892.57 7133.25 
Russia (Soviet Union) 365 15010 0 366949.32 14537.64 10335.8 8740.53 
Finland 375 276 13075.65 35748.47 18239.41 3202.14 20058.64 
Sweden 380 359 17243.79 28111.99 20764.26 1457.91 21731 
Norway 385 334 14477.72 36734.85 19513.1 3103.01 24270.05 
Denmark 390 51 15163.39 28847.32 19383.03 2655.55 21189.64 
Iceland 395 126 6300.37 22816.22 19260.73 4442.06 22355.63 
Cape Verde 402 16 1419.55 1426.18 1424.86 1.47 1425.05 
Guinea-Bissau 404 13 515.96 541.94 531.65 7.42 533.19 
Equatorial Guinea 411 12 1701.59 1874.84 1799.21 71.31 1794.23 
Gambia 420 3 879.33 880.34 880 0.59 880.18 
Mali 432 428 8.7 2989.75 749.64 511.69 665.94 
Senegal 433 75 1088.26 1175.38 1150.7 15.92 1156.7 
Benin 434 40 637.34 1070.5 793.49 140.1 907.91 
Mauritania 435 403 736.31 10319.34 1754.85 1149.33 1527.76 
Niger 436 402 98.56 4814.16 1414.07 1119.65 599.02 
Côte d'Ivoire 437 113 1349.76 1450.45 1416.04 9.32 1415.27 
Guinea 438 85 782.23 818.35 796.37 4.65 795.49 
Burkina Faso 439 87 438.25 785.77 658.27 57.71 647.43 
Liberia 450 37 2298.26 2305.81 2302.91 2.45 2304.09 
Sierra Leone 451 30 536.85 537.61 537.33 0.19 537.41 
Ghana 452 85 590.25 1002.07 765.41 102.47 743.29 
168
Appendices
Country GWno 
No. 
cells 
min 
GCPpc 
max 
GCPpc 
mean 
GCPpc 
s.d. 
GCPpc GDPpc 
Togo 461 19 728.46 741.33 734.58 4.59 737.33 
Cameroon 471 156 1178.81 4681.49 1774.98 615.47 1804.08 
Nigeria 475 312 699.51 242808.66 1780.95 13704.33 1020.22 
Gabon 481 94 9703.92 16038.67 13638.64 1019.02 11892.6 
Central African Rep. 482 202 328.34 1429.06 573.92 138.47 696.63 
Chad 483 391 450.8 28338.5 749.43 1437.38 776.48 
Congo 484 112 2391.29 2513.55 2477.73 34.13 2504.94 
DR Congo (Zaire) 490 763 370.4 5966.71 452.1 220.53 476.67 
Uganda 500 80 27.48 796.57 481.96 141.91 471.18 
Kenya 501 192 161.46 12890.33 1392.95 1807.7 1250.19 
Tanzania 510 316 306.4 1156.9 697.27 211.44 646.29 
Burundi 516 11 420.85 425.84 422.95 1.9 422.51 
Rwanda 517 9 589.82 589.86 589.84 0.02 589.84 
Somalia 520 241 144.94 5073.7 727.04 419.72 626.35 
Djibouti 522 9 2593.45 2607.14 2601.52 5.11 2604.79 
Ethiopia 530 424 193.33 1041.76 423 91.31 436.24 
Angola 540 435 864.65 237724.83 3006.43 16001.42 1939.22 
Mozambique 541 302 92.69 1323.43 375.73 215.15 353.21 
Zambia 551 250 534.08 1639.09 781.89 177.88 964.99 
Zimbabwe 552 135 1143.56 3723.31 2566.7 432.02 2442.73 
Malawi 553 39 534.08 534.8 534.66 0.16 534.74 
South Africa 560 483 1259.74 220862.25 11633.95 21317.95 6702.35 
Namibia 565 307 260.07 40640.24 7150.68 7763.57 3660.66 
Lesotho 570 12 1339.9 1510 1462.18 58.14 1475.58 
Botswana 571 205 1472.33 14329.54 3851.85 2832.03 5756.12 
Swaziland 572 5 4054.17 4133.28 4069.99 35.38 4059.04 
Madagascar 580 255 684.98 988.09 779.86 75.06 830.35 
Comoros 581 5 998.46 1108.42 1045.54 57.75 1057.98 
Mauritius 590 6 4887.63 5055.53 4999.57 86.68 5054.08 
Morocco 600 242 1049.72 9702.66 2451.63 1482.38 2354.09 
Algeria 615 870 2831.84 664972.84 9628.79 45361.06 4495.18 
Tunisia 616 72 3101.69 4029.36 3406.5 255.34 3408.46 
Libya 620 655 8140.33 565393.81 20925.83 57746.65 14556.5 
Sudan 625 840 247.86 2690.41 687.01 341.6 833.6 
Iran 630 644 820.08 135110.44 12687.64 22254.17 5590.54 
Turkey 640 368 1071.98 11271.61 4392.45 2021.97 5045.3 
Iraq 645 169 3207.56 12642.54 5393.45 1347.37 5994.97 
Egypt 651 388 81.8 3062677.95 131378.63 
471607.3
3 2897.16 
Syria 652 72 857.12 7578.02 3411.84 1809 2489.11 
Lebanon 660 5 5654.44 5655.47 5655.21 0.45 5655.39 
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Country GWno 
No. 
cells 
min 
GCPpc 
max 
GCPpc 
mean 
GCPpc 
s.d. 
GCPpc GDPpc 
Jordan 663 34 2720.81 2805.39 2782.91 23.22 2802.45 
Israel 666 15 10996.46 24576.05 16284.87 4678.12 14512.8 
Saudi Arabia 670 722 485.61 1150064.78 21744.59 95645.72 17375.84 
Yemen 678 168 988.77 10447.09 1554.37 1400.87 1587.84 
Kuwait 690 9 4083.56 90978.58 35279.4 28385.03 21921.89 
Bahrain 692 1 11125.74 11125.74 11125.74 NA 11125.74 
Qatar 694 9 26447.99 571824.91 244440.7 232588.2 34084.83 
United Arab Emirates 696 33 33281.55 33446.81 33388.08 45.03 33422.64 
Oman 698 128 3993.86 12501.26 11099.43 2032.06 12158.17 
Afghanistan 700 255 213.91 51847.65 2136.03 4749.98 1062.9 
China 710 3880 133.11 3133.64 930.03 245.31 980.39 
Mongolia 712 741 222.03 10569.03 2377.79 1378.97 1830.53 
Taiwan 713 23 7513.78 8613.66 8526.8 221.01 8570.96 
PR Korea 731 65 924.52 4121.5 2010.96 702.87 1779.99 
R Korea 732 60 5400.38 19110.91 9675.97 2480.22 9484.29 
Japan 740 273 4008.96 430549.89 33046.22 32816.02 22897.6 
India 750 1197 464.63 8351.56 1188.51 895.15 1051.46 
Bhutan 760 12 1501.37 1502.39 1501.73 0.31 1501.74 
Pakistan 770 336 620.26 5487.5 1444.79 629.2 1550.61 
Bangladesh 771 55 502.7 941.93 635.79 109.53 624.8 
Myanmar (Burma) 775 265 209.52 392.68 284.86 21.93 299.21 
Sri Lanka 780 37 682.11 3435.55 1812.05 575.49 1778.13 
Maldives 781 20 380.21 12337.49 4404.55 2812.14 3471.11 
Nepal 790 53 602.97 647.31 627.88 7.11 626.73 
Thailand 800 196 1037.13 12333.9 2720.99 2257.27 3752.64 
Cambodia  811 64 260.77 1651.66 965.2 210.46 1006.78 
Laos 812 79 752.45 1078.95 859.21 58.37 888.15 
DR Vietnam 816 138 211.68 1595.36 670.91 233.78 754.92 
Malaysia 820 144 2150.61 9626.13 5360.21 1261.94 5792.17 
Singapore 830 1 21238.64 21238.64 21238.64 NA 21238.64 
Brunei 835 4 41490.44 44330.17 43620.24 1419.86 44315.41 
Philippines 840 236 859.93 4367.44 1686.56 629.33 2170.77 
Indonesia 850 1047 0 105377.88 4513.98 10467.3 1772.96 
Australia 900 3038 833.22 45573.84 20316.08 4711.22 20592.54 
Papua New Guinea 910 250 943.46 3618.18 1108.94 364.79 1285.37 
New Zealand 920 190 12058.86 23458.15 15796.46 1755.74 16027.24 
Solomon Islands 940 52 739.02 5791.13 2958.78 1689.48 1835.21 
Fiji 950 25 1534.3 10603.9 4735.74 2576.75 3237.69 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for Full Sample of Cells 
Variable N Mean St. dev. Min Max
Ln GCP pc 55707 8.71 1.36 2.16 14.93
Ln GPD pc 55707 8.7 1.22 5.86 10.7
Ln infant mortality rate 53164 5.42 1.01 2.94 7.9
Positive income deviations 55707 0.59 12.54 0 1067.91
Negative income deviations 55707 -0.13 0.18 -1 0
Least Developed Country 55707 0.06 0.23 0 1
Ln distance to border (+1) 55707 1.02 0.7 0 2.79
Ln distance to capital (+1) 55707 7.03 1.07 2.51 8.98
Capital city 55707 0 0.05 0 1
Forrest cover (%) 55707 40.53 42.09 0 100
Mountainous terrain (%) 55707 23.66 36.43 0 100
Ln Population 55707 9.74 2.98 2.33 17.09
No. of cells (*1000) 55707 5132.75 5747.25 1 14518  
 
 
Table A3: Summary Statistics for Case Control Sample of Cells 
Variable N Mean St. dev. Min Max
Ln GCP pc 342 8.59 1.33 5.28 11.86
Ln GPD pc 342 8.63 1.24 5.86 10.24
Ln infant mortality rate 330 5.5 1.01 2.94 7.42
Positive income deviations 342 0.25 0.83 0 11.6
Negative income deviations 342 -0.14 0.2 -0.95 0
Least developed country 342 0.08 0.27 0 1
Ln distance to border (+1) 342 1.02 0.72 0 2.71
Ln distance to capital (+1) 342 6.93 1.13 3.13 8.78
Capital city 342 0.02 0.14 0 1
Forest cover (%) 342 37.53 41.92 0 100
Mountainous terrain (%) 342 23.6 36.54 0 100
Ln Population 342 10.17 2.97 2.52 15.85
No. of cells (*1000) 342 4808.02 5524.2 1 14518  
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Table A4: Estimates for Country Level Data, Model 3 Including Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Control Variables 
 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of Average Pairwise Cell Distances across Full Sample and Case 
Control Sample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. SE Z Coef. SE Z Coef. SE Z
Intercept 3.482 1.239 2.809 4.592 1.731 2.653 0.519 4.711 0.11
Ln min. GCP pc -0.708 0.183 -3.869 -0.636 0.199 -3.192 -0.857 0.289 -2.959
Ln GDP pc -0.206 0.218 -0.948 -0.410 0.508 -0.807
LDC * ln max. GCP pc 1.662 1.304 1.275
Cell variance scaled 2.839 2.133 1.331
Ln No. of cells -0.418 0.305 -1.371
Ln Population 0.574 0.288 1.994
Ln mountainous terrain 0.246 0.208 1.185
Non-contiguous 1.725 0.933 1.849
Oil-producing state 0.774 0.852 0.908
New state -13.907 1455.4 -0.01
Instability -0.197 0.846 -0.233
Polity II 0.126 0.059 2.117
Ethnic fractionalization 1.854 1.093 1.697
Religious fractionalization 0.851 1.503 0.566
N 149 149 132
Log likelihood     -63.66 (df=2)      -63.20 (df=3)   -46.38 (df=15)
LR Chi-Square     19.56 (df=1)     20.47 (df=2)     46.24 (df=14)
AIC 131.31 132.40 122.76
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Appendix to Article II 
“Explaining the Development–Civil War Relationship” 
 
Constructing the Economic Opportunity Cost Indicator, BDI per Capita 
Not all the choices underlying the economic opportunity cost indicator, Bottom Decile Income 
(BDI) per capita, could be thoroughly explained in the article. First, the main reason for using 
household surveys rather than national accounts data to measure income is that incomes in poorer 
countries tend to be underestimated in national accounts data mainly due to their larger informal 
sector. My data also suggests that this is the case. The ratio of survey income to GDP clearly 
declines with economic development. An OLS regression of the ratio of survey income to GDP 
on GDP pc (logged) shows that the ratio decreases by between 52-34 % with 95 % confidence, 
when moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of GDP pc.  
 Another question concerns which bottom quantile of the income distribution should be 
used. Whether to use the bottom decile (10%) or the bottom quintile (20%) can hardly be deter-
mined by theory. This choice is inconsequential, however, because mean bottom decile income is 
almost perfectly correlated with mean bottom quintile income in the survey data (r = 0.993).  
 The “mean income” estimate in the World Bank survey data is based on consumption 
expenditure for 2/3 of the observations and income for the rest. Income and consumption ex-
penditure is clearly not equivalent. However, when looking at the income of the poor, it appears 
not to matter much whether income or expenditure is measured. Income has a higher mean value 
than expenditure, but is also less equally distributed.  Chen and Ravallion (2004:13) assessed this 
by comparing surveys of both income and expenditure distribution for 27 countries. They found 
only a small and statistically non-significant difference between their poverty headcount 
measures based on income and those based on expenditure. I consider the risk of error from using 
all the data to be considerably lower than the costs in terms of precision and potential bias of 
excluding the third of the sample which has data on income, but not expenditure. 
 The number of countries included in the sample is limited by data availability. I only 
include countries with at least one original BDI pc survey observation in the main sample. My 
sample then contains 133 out of the 157 independent countries in the 1980-2006 period with a 
population above half a million.1 BDI pc values could be tried imputed for countries without any 
                                                 
1 The population restriction follows most other studies of civil war. Countries with less than half a million inhabitants 
will have a very small chance of experiencing a number of battle-deaths high enough to meet the civil war defini-
tion’s threshold.  
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original surveys using some other variables, like GDP per capita, as predictors in a statistical 
imputation model, but I consider the probable loss of reliability from this to be higher than the 
efficiency gains from a larger sample. Also, such an approach would bias the predicted BDI 
values towards the other explanatory variables of interest used in the imputation model, like GDP 
pc, roads and % urban. The countries excluded from the sample due to lack of data are listed in 
Table A1. Exclusion from the sample appears not to be systematically related to the risk of con-
flict onset: the percentage of country-years with an armed conflict onset is only slightly higher in 
the excluded countries (2.20 %) than in the included countries (1.75 %), and the difference is not 
statistically significant (p = 0.45).  
 The availability of survey data also places limits on the temporal extent of the sample. 
Figure A1 shows the total number of country survey observations by year for the 133 countries 
included, and a three-year average of this number. The number of surveys is low for most of the 
1980s, but rises sharply in the beginning of the 1990s. Figure A2 shows the mean of the number 
of years before each country’s first survey observation by starting point. If the sample started in 
Table A1. List of Countries Excluded from the Sample by Region 
Region Countries Excluded 
South & East Asia Afghanistan   
 Fiji 
 Japan 
 Korea, People’s Rep. 
 Myanmar 
 New Zealand 
Singapore 
  
Middle East & North  Bahrain  
Africa Cyprus  
 Iraq  
Kuwait 
 Lebanon 
 Libya 
 Oman  
 Saudi Arabia  
 Syria 
United Arab Emirates 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa Eritrea  
Liberia 
 Mauritius 
Somalia 
 Sudan 
 Zimbabwe 
  
Latin America Cuba 
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1980, there would be an average gap of almost 10 years before each country’s first survey; start-
ing in 1990, the average gap would decline to 2.3 years. One would have to extrapolate most time 
series far back to include all years from 1980. On the other hand, starting as late as the mid-
1990s, one would lose much valuable information. Since civil war onset is a rare event, onset-
years provide more valuable information than non-onset years. The years 1989-1993 have many 
onsets, whereas the years before 1989 have very few onsets (Figure A3). This, together with the 
fact that there is a great increase in surveys from around 1990, leads me to restrict the sample to 
the 1989-2006 period. I do not go beyond 2006 because I lack data both for BDI pc and some 
other explanatory variables for these years.  
 
Figure A1. Number of Country Survey Observations over Time in the Sample  
 
 
 
Figure A2. Mean Number of Years to the First Survey in the Countries 
 
175
Appendix to Article II
 The time-series still have holes when limiting the sample to the 1989-2006 period. The 
mean number of years with surveys for the countries in the sample is 3.7, and 16 countries have 
only one survey observation. Clearly, values in the time-series must be imputed to facilitate a 
statistical analysis. Two imputation methods stand out as the best candidates. The first is linear 
interpolation and the second is using growth rates of national accounts data (household expendi-
ture or GDP) to extend the time-series. The second may be recommendable if there are many 
years between the observations and BDI follows the same time trend as these national accounts 
measures. The mean number of years between two surveys is 2.7, and 37 countries have more 
than five years between two surveys, 15 countries have more than seven years between two sur-
veys, and 4 countries have more than 10 years between two surveys. Looking at some of the 
countries with long intermittence between surveys suggests that interpolation may still be the best 
alternative, as BDI pc sometimes does not follow the trend of GDP pc. Guinea, Rwanda, and 
Sierra Leone are examples of this. I therefore choose interpolation between surveys as the first 
imputation method, and turn to national accounts data as an alternative to linear extrapolation 
when interpolation is not possible. BDI pc is log-transformed before interpolating.  
  In the next step, I use the existing BDI pc observations as reference points, and extend the 
time-series using the growth rate of private household consumption expenditure pc (PPP) from 
national accounts (World Bank 2008). I thus assume that the Lorenz curve has not shifted, and 
 
Figure A3. Total Number of Onsets by Year in the Country Sample 
 
176
Appendices
that growth rate of national accounts private consumption expenditure per capita changes in 
parallel with the survey mean income/expenditure.2  
 In the third step, for observations lacking data on private consumption expenditure I use 
the growth rate of GDP pc (PPP) to estimate missing BDI observations. I primarily use data from 
the World Bank (2008) on PPP-adjusted GDP pc 2005US$. For states that have experienced 
border changes, I use the estimates of “Real” (PPP-adjusted) GDP pc from Gleditsch (2002).3  
After this step, only six observations (and no onsets) are left missing.4 Table A2 shows the num-
ber of BDI observations imputed with each method.   
 Figure A4 shows the time-series of Spain as an example, where there are four original 
survey observations – for 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000. Between these surveys, interpolation is 
used to estimate missing values. For the remaining years, 2001-2006, the growth rate of house-
hold consumption per capita is used to extend the time-series. The imputed and original BDI pc 
values are shown by different symbols, whereas household consumption pc is shown with a line. 
We can see that BDI follows household consumption quite closely over time, giving confidence 
to the imputed values.  
 An alternative to extrapolating the BDI values using national accounts data is multiple 
imputation: building a statistical model to estimate the missing values (Honaker and King 2010). 
I perform an out-of-sample prediction test to evaluate the relative performance of these two 
methods. I select the 9 countries with most BDI survey observations (more than 7) and existing 
observations in 2005 or 2006. I then remove their observations for 2000-2006 from the sample, 
and try to predict these values using my method of extending the time-series and multiple imputa-
tion. I construct a multiple imputation model and use Amelia II to estimate the missing values 
                                                 
2 This imputation method is used by Chen and Ravallion (2004) for the same survey data. Household consumption 
expenditure per capita (PPP) is correlated r = 0.90 with BDI. The same correlation is found with GDP per capita 
(PPP). All variables are logged. 
3 I also use PWT 6.3 “Real” GDP per capita estimates for a few country-years missing in WDI (2008) (Heston, 
Summers, and Aten 2009). 
4 The missings are 5 years in Turkmenistan’s time-series and Yugoslavia, 1989.  
Table A2.  Number of Imputed BDI per Capita Observations  
Source / imputation method N 
Survey  495 
Interpolation between survey observations 1038 
Predicted using growth rate of household expenditure pc (national accounts) 491 
Predicted using growth rate of GDP per capita, PPP (national accounts) 299 
Observations, total 2323 
Missing after imputation 6 
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based on this.5  I impute five datasets and calculate the mean BDI value for these five datasets. 
The results suggest that extending the time-series using national accounts data works considera-
bly better than the multiple imputation model. The extended time-series BDI and the true (inter-
polated) values correlate r = 0.91, whereas the correlation between the multiply imputed BDI and 
the true values for is a low r = 0.35 (N=47).6 The mean percentage error (in either positive or 
negative direction) is 2.6 % for the extended BDI and 6.8 % for the multiply imputed BDI. 
 
 
                                                 
5 I tried several different models. The best one, which I settled for, included these variables: BDI, GDP pc (ln), 
Accessibility index, Population (ln), proximity to war, civil war onset, household consumption pc (ln), infant mortali-
ty rate (ln), Polity 2 (democracy/autocracy scale), Oil production value pc, region dummies, country dummies, and 
year dummies with three polynomials.   
6 Looking only at the original survey observations without interpolating between them gives quite similar correla-
tions. R=0.85 for extended BDI and r = 0.38 for multiply imputed BDI (N=20).   
 
Figure A4. Spain BDI per Capita Time-Series Scatter Plot 
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Tables of Coefficients from Regressions in the Article 
 
Table A3. Coefficients from Regressions Underlying Figure 2 in the Article    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln GDP pc  -0.48***      
 (0.14)      
Ln BDI pc   -0.25     
  (0.17)     
State reach   -3.25***    
   (0.95)    
Ln Road pc    -0.46*** 
(0.14) 
  
%Urban      -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 
Ln Tel pc      -0.27*** 
(0.09) 
Ln Population 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.33** 0.39*** 0.41*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) 
Proximity of  1.40*** 1.57*** 1.44*** 1.62*** 1.45*** 1.45*** 
war (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.44) 
Constant -7.46*** -9.78*** -9.14*** -9.58*** -9.98*** -11.13*** 
 (2.15) (2.31) (2.33) (2.91) (2.00) (2.52) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 2321 
Onsets 48 48 48 48 48 48 
log pseudo LL -202.44 -207.42 -201.85 -205.50 -202.48 -202.91 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01 
Dependent variable is civil war onset (UCDP/PRIO data, Sambanis threshold) in all models. 
 
 
 
Table A4. Coefficients from Regressions Underlying Figure 3 in the Article    
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln GDP pc -0.88*** -0.12  
 (0.26) (0.34)  
Ln BDI pc  0.59*  0.46* 
 (0.35)  (0.26) 
State reach  -2.54 -5.11*** 
  (2.26) (1.30) 
Ln Population 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.35** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
Proximity of war 1.40*** 1.42*** 1.50*** 
 (0.44) (0.42) (0.45) 
Constant -7.64*** -8.64*** -10.41*** 
 (2.30) (2.50) (2.71) 
Observations 2321 2321 2321 
Onsets 48 48 48 
log pseudo LL -200.41 -201.79 -200.23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01 
Dependent variable is civil war onset (UCDP/PRIO data, Sambanis threshold) in all models. 
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Table A5. Coefficients from Regressions Underlying Figure 4 in the Article  
 (1) 
Sambanis 
onset; 
Fearon-Laitin 
controls 
(2) 
Sambanis 
onset; Amelia 
BDI imputa-
tions 
(3) 
Sambanis 
onset; 4 yr 
intermit 
(4) 
Sambanis 
onset; late 
coding 
(5) 
UCDP/PRIO 
civil war 
onset 
Ln BDI pc  0.77*** 0.75** 0.69*** 0.41* 0.32 
 (0.219) (0.335) (0.234) (0.237) (0.308) 
State reach -7.49*** -6.48*** -5.85*** -3.98*** -4.06** 
 (1.607) (1.681) (1.240) (1.230) (1.988) 
Ln Population 0.25** 0.34** 0.31** 0.28* 0.03 
 (0.111) (0.155) (0.148) (0.144) (0.133) 
Proximity of war 0.86 1.57*** 1.36*** 2.00*** 1.53** 
 (0.584) (0.456) (0.486) (0.478) (0.612) 
New state  (dummy) 3.28***     
 (0.808)     
Noncontiguous  0.91**     
state (dummy) (0.375)     
Ln %Mountainous  0.13     
terrain (0.110)     
Democracy  0.02     
 (0.029)     
Instability (dummy) -0.04     
 (0.442)     
Ethno-linguistic  1.91**     
fractionalization (0.752)     
Religious  0.07     
fractionalization (0.689)     
Prior war (dummy) -0.18     
 (0.519)     
Oil dependency  1.34     
(dummy) (0.944)     
Constant -10.71*** -11.33*** -10.86*** -9.78*** -5.38** 
 (2.322) (2.879) (2.668) (2.535) (2.274) 
Observations 2,224 2,321 2,321 2,321 2,321 
Onsets 47 48 39 47 25 
log pseudo LL -178.2  -173.6 -197.2 -127.9 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01 
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Table of Coefficients from Additional Tests 
 
Table A6. Coefficients from Additional Regression Models  
 (1) 
Sambanis onset, 
BDI-Africa 
interact. 
(2) 
Sambanis onset, 
State reach-
Africa interact. 
(3) 
Sambanis onset, 
excluding Ethi-
opia 
Ln BDI pc  0.53** 0.63*** 0.44 
 (0.251) (0.223) (0.278) 
State reach -4.94*** -5.69*** -4.84*** 
 (1.447) (1.560) (1.534) 
Africa (dummy) 0.19 0.91  
 (0.650) (0.727)  
Ln BDI pc*Africa -0.10   
 (0.509)   
State reach*Africa  2.61  
  (2.930)  
Ln Population  0.37** 0.38*** 0.35** 
 (0.149) (0.145) (0.153) 
Proximity of war 1.53*** 1.61*** 1.49*** 
 (0.445) (0.461) (0.472) 
Constant -11.42*** -11.71*** -10.42*** 
 (2.653) (2.581) (2.851) 
Observations 2,321 2,321 2,303 
Onsets 48 48 48 
log pseudo LL -200.0 -199.6 -190.4 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01 
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Appendix to Article III 
“Relative Capacity and the Spread of Rebellion: Insights from Nepal” 
 
 
Time Plots for Key Variables 
Figures A1-A3 show how the values of onset versus non-onset districts change over time for the 
variables that I hypothesize should have a temporally contingent effect. The onset observations 
are marked by dots, the running mean of the onset observations by the short-dashed line,7 the 
running mean of the non-onset observations by the long-dashed line, and the standard deviation 
of the remaining observations in the sample is shown by the solid line. The figures show that, as 
hypothesized, the early onset districts tend to have considerably higher levels of UPF support, 
lower accessibility, and a higher proportion have nearby insurgency than the average non-onset 
district. For all the variables, the difference between onset and non-onset districts declines over 
time, and from around 2001-2002 there is no, or almost no, difference.  The figures also address 
the concern that the variance in the sample may decline over time, as districts see onset (failure) 
and drop out. For UPF support, the variance declines somewhat over time, but there is still con-
siderable variance left at the time of the last onset observation. For accessibility, the variance is 
almost constant over time. For nearby insurgency, in contrast, variance steeply declined in the 
first half of 2002, and by mid-2002 all remaining districts had at least one insurgency nearby. 
This is not a considerable problem for testing my hypothesis of temporal contingency, since by 
early 2002 the divergence between onset and non-onset districts had already disappeared.        
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The running means are calculated using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) with a bandwidth of 
0.8.  
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 Figure A1. Variance and Onset and Non-Onset Means of Accessibility over Time 
 
 
Figure A2. Variance and Onset and Non-Onset Means of UPF Support over Time 
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 Robustness Tests 
Below, I show results from models using an alternative rebel-to-government troops measure 
primarily based on government sources. Table A1 lists the government information that is used 
for this variable. Since government estimates are missing for several years, I use Maoist sources 
for the initial two years and linear inter- and extrapolation for the rest. The final values are listed 
in the ‘Mean estimate’ column. 
 Tables A2-A4 shows results from Cox analyses using different operationalizations of the 
dependent variable as well as one additional measure of relative capacity: rebel-to-government 
troops based on estimates from government sources. The models of Table A2 use a slightly lower 
threshold for onset: 3 (instead of 5) days of insurgent killings in a half-year period. Most of the 
central variable coefficients are quite similar. The largest difference is that the accessibility inter-
actions with time and rebel-to-government troops become weaker. The interactions with rebel-to-
government troops based on data from government sources (fourth column) give results very 
similar to the other relative capacity measures.8   
 In Table A3, insurgency onset is operationalized as at the first time a district experiences 
at least five days of insurgent or government killings. The signs of the main variables remain 
similar, but results become somewhat more dependent on the relative capacity measure em-
ployed. The three first nearby insurgency interactions become even more strongly negative, 
                                                 
8 The coefficients are smaller, but the range of this variable is larger than the other relative capacity measures, imply-
ing that the difference of moving from a low to a high quantile on the variable is relatively similar. 
Table A1. Rebel-to-Government Troops, Government Sources 
Year Gov. estima-
te 
Mean estimate 
(inter-
/extrapolated.) 
Source 
1996 Missing 200 Commander of Maoist PLA’s Eastern Division, “Ananta”; 
cited in Ogura (2008:13) 
1997 Missing 350 Maoist Central Committee member; cited in Onesto 
(2005:92) 
1998 2300-3450 2875 Police estimates; referred to in Manchanda (1998)  
1999 5000-6000 5500 Police estimates; referred to in Singh (1999) 
2000 Missing 6500  
2001 5000-10000 7500 Government officials; referred to Miglani (2001) 
2002 Missing 8000  
2003 Missing 8500  
2004 Missing 9000  
2005 9500 9500 Colonel Victor J.B. Rana, RNA press conference, May 
2005; referred to in ICG (2005:8) 
2006 Missing 10000  
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whereas the interaction with the second rebel-to-government troops measure becomes slightly 
weaker, although still negative. For accessibility, the interactions with time and two of the relative 
capacity measures are clearly positive (but only significant for the last measure), whereas it is 
almost zero for the first rebel-to-government troops measure.      
 In Table A4, insurgency onset is operationalized as at the first time a district experiences 
at least ten conflict-related fatalities (all victims and perpetrators included). Results for UPF 
support are largely similar, and strongly significant. The nearby insurgency coefficients become 
more strongly dependent on time and relative capacity using this onset measure. The influence of 
accessibility, on the other hand, becomes less consistently dependent on time and relative capaci-
ty. Two of the relative capacity interactions with accessibility are positive, as hypothesized, but 
one becomes negative (although not significant).  
 In general, these tests indicate that the contingency of UPF support and nearby insurgen-
cy on relative capacity is robust to changes in operationalization of insurgency onset and relative 
capacity.  The influence of accessibility is consistently declining over time, but its dependency on 
relative capacity is somewhat less certain. Two out of the eleven estimates of interaction with 
relative capacity (from all tables) show nu such dependency.  
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Table A2. Cox Models Using Alternative Onset Threshold (3 Days of Maoist Killings in 6 
Months) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Interactions 
with time  
Interactions 
with 
rebel-to-gov. 
troops, Mil. Bal. 
source 
Interactions 
with 
gov. force 
fatalities 
Interactions 
with 
rebel-to-gov. 
troops, Gov. 
sources 
Radio ownership, % 0.052** 0.051** 0.052** 0.052** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
UPF support, % 0.065** 0.062** 0.065** 0.045 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) 
Nearby insurgency 1.110* 1.190* 1.132* 1.653** 
 (0.540) (0.577) (0.574) (0.524) 
Accessibility -1.276** -1.059** -1.066** -1.035** 
 (0.395) (0.341) (0.308) (0.298) 
UPF support x  -0.026**    
Time, years (0.008)    
UPF support x  -0.015  -0.012** 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.008)  (0.003) 
UPF support x   -0.019  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.010)  
Nearby insurgency x  -0.337    
Time, years (0.271)    
Nearby insurgency x   -0.267  -0.131 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.262)  (0.083) 
Nearby insurgency x    -0.401  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.373)  
Accessibility x  0.257    
Time, years (0.153)    
Accessibility x  0.069  0.043 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.113)  (0.034) 
Accessibility x   0.093  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.165)  
HDI -5.977 -6.885* -7.442* -6.745* 
 (3.632) (3.498) (3.558) (3.341) 
Communist mandates 0.060 0.063 0.079 0.051 
 (0.166) (0.158) (0.160) (0.150) 
Tenants, % -0.026 -0.020 -0.018 -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Magars, % -0.030 -0.025 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Hill high-castes, % -1.884* -1.826 -1.868 -2.015* 
 (0.942) (0.937) (0.989) (0.902) 
log Population 1.244** 1.237** 1.252** 1.310** 
 (0.265) (0.249) (0.251) (0.238) 
Onsets (failures) 70 70 70 70 
Districts 75 75 75 75 
log pseudo LL -206.8 -210.8 -210.6 -204.1 
Onset threshold:  Three days of insurgent killings within a half-year period. Coefficients shown. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  
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Table A3. Cox Models Using Alternative Onset Threshold (5 Days of Fatal Events in 6 
Months) 
Variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Interactions 
with time  
Interactions 
with 
rebel-to-gov. 
troops, Mil. 
Bal. source 
Interactions 
with 
gov. force 
fatalities 
Interactions 
with 
rebel-to-gov. 
troops, Gov. 
sources 
Radio ownership, % 0.038* 0.038* 0.039* 0.043* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
UPF support, % 0.039* 0.038* 0.042* 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) 
Nearby insurgency 0.121 0.051 0.104 0.401 
 (0.426) (0.443) (0.438) (0.425) 
Accessibility -1.055** -0.876** -1.008** -0.977** 
 (0.299) (0.287) (0.281) (0.289) 
UPF support x  -0.020**    
Time, years (0.007)    
UPF support x  -0.020*  -0.010** 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.010)  (0.003) 
UPF support x   -0.022*  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.010)  
Nearby insurgency x  -0.515*    
Time, years (0.257)    
Nearby insurgency x   -0.570  -0.090 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.306)  (0.068) 
Nearby insurgency x    -0.951**  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.302)  
Accessibility x  0.159    
Time, years (0.114)    
Accessibility x  0.005  0.065* 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.102)  (0.030) 
Accessibility x   0.140  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.139)  
HDI -3.911 -4.636 -4.849 -4.623 
 (3.834) (3.788) (3.818) (3.736) 
Communist mandates -0.059 -0.034 -0.053 -0.070 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) 
Tenants, % -0.042* -0.040* -0.039* -0.043** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Magars, % -0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) 
Hill high-castes, % -1.057 -0.928 -0.899 -1.344 
 (0.807) (0.807) (0.846) (0.857) 
log Population 0.893** 0.906** 0.920** 1.023** 
 (0.182) (0.178) (0.177) (0.191) 
Onsets (failures) 70 70 70 70 
Districts 75 75 75 75 
log pseudo LL -206.8 -210.8 -210.6 -204.1 
Onset threshold:  Five days of insurgent or government killings within a half-year period. Coefficients 
shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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 Table A4. Cox Models Using Alternative Onset Threshold (10 Fatalities in 6 Months) 
Variables (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Interactions 
with time  
Interactions 
with 
rebel-to-gov. 
troops, Mil. 
Bal. source 
Interactions 
with 
gov. force 
fatalities 
Interactions 
with 
rebel-to-gov. 
troops, Gov. 
sources 
Radio ownership, % 0.044* 0.041* 0.043* 0.046** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
UPF support, % 0.031 0.028 0.035* 0.006 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) 
Nearby insurgency -0.310 -0.327 -0.337 0.088 
 (0.416) (0.433) (0.424) (0.438) 
Accessibility -0.641* -0.486 -0.680* -0.634 
 (0.324) (0.310) (0.326) (0.348) 
UPF support x  -0.027**    
Time, years (0.009)    
UPF support x  -0.023*  -0.010** 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.010)  (0.003) 
UPF support x   -0.029**  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.011)  
Nearby insurgency x  -0.508    
Time, years (0.270)    
Nearby insurgency x   -0.626*  -0.131 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.308)  (0.077) 
Nearby insurgency x    -0.685*  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.289)  
Accessibility x  0.130    
Time, years (0.145)    
Accessibility x  -0.100  0.026 
Rebel-to-gov. troops, %  (0.141)  (0.037) 
Accessibility x   0.107  
Gov. force fatalities   (0.148)  
HDI -9.990* -10.705* -10.476* -10.321* 
 (4.373) (4.287) (4.309) (4.254) 
Communist mandates -0.080 -0.062 -0.070 -0.083 
 (0.101) (0.104) (0.104) (0.102) 
Tenants, % -0.014 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Magars, % 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.012 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
Hill high-castes, % 1.485 1.774* 1.585 1.084 
 (0.833) (0.884) (0.888) (0.906) 
log Population 0.736** 0.798** 0.794** 0.893** 
 (0.198) (0.210) (0.190) (0.216) 
Onsets (failures) 73 73 73 73 
Districts 75 75 75 75 
log pseudo LL -214.4 -218.5 -216.6 -214.3 
Onset threshold:  Ten conflict-related fatalities within a half-year period. Coefficients shown. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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 Table A5. Data Sources  
Variable Source 
Onset of insurgency INSEC (2010) event data 
UPF support, % Election Commission (1992) 
Communist mandates Election Commission (1992) 
Magars, % Sharma (2008) 
Hill high-castes, % Do and Iyer (2010) 
Mean slope, %   CBS, WFP, WB (2006) 
Forested, % Do and Iyer (2010)  
Roads Do and Iyer (2010) 
Distance from capital http://www.distancefromto.net/ 
Tenants, % Joshi and Mason (2008) 
Radio ownership, % UNDP (2004) 
HDI UNDP (2004) 
Population CBS (1991) 
Government force fatalities INSEC (2010) event data  
Rebel-to-government troops Government troops: International Institute for Strate-
gic Studies (1996/1997-2006/2007). Sources for rebel 
troops listed in the text and in the appendix.  
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 Table A6. Summary Statistics  
N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable      
Insurgency onset 2678 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Stable covariates  
 Radio ownership, % 75 53.38 12.43 30.07 80.94 
 UPF votes, % 75 5.58 10.31 0 54.08 
Accessibility 75 0 0.77 -1.38 2.33 
HDI 75 0.45 0.07 0.30 0.65 
 Communist mandates 75 1.11 1.28 0 6.00 
 Tenants, % 75 11.76 9.29 0 43.24 
 Magars, % 75 8.17 10.61 0 50.90 
 Hill high-castes, % 75 0.41 0.22 0.04 0.85 
log Population  75 12.16 0.85 8.59 13.42 
Time-varying covariates 
     
Nearby insurgency 2678 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Time, years 60 6.01 1.74 0.03 8.87 
 Gov. force fatalities, daily 60 1.78 0.97 0.00 3.17 
 Rebel-to-gov. troops, % 8 3.36 1.52 0.71 5.49 
 (Source: Mil. Balance)      
 Rebel-to-gov. troops, % 8 10.07 5.83 0.71 18.75 
  (Source: Gov. officials)      
Note: For the time-varying variables, the onset operationalization in the article is used. Insurgency onset and 
nearby insurgency are coded for each remaining (non-failing) district at each failure date, giving 2678 observa-
tions. Stable covariates vary over districts (75). Time (fractions of years allowed) and gov. force fatalities vary 
over failure times (60); and the rebel-to-government troops measures vary over years (8; the sample begins with 
the first onset in February 1996 and ends with the last onset in December 2004).  
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Appendix to Article IV 
“How Can Initially Weak Insurgent Groups Grow? Lessons from 
Nepal” 
 
Table A1. List of Interviews 
Nr. of 
interview Interviewee(s), short description Interviewee’s place of origin 
1 Journalist Jungar, Rolpa 
2 Congress Party district chairman, Rolpa Rolpa (VDC unknown) 
3 Student, then Maoist full-timer (PLA) Rangsi, Rolpa  
4 Student, then Maoist full-timer (PLA) Madichaur, Rolpa 
5 Man Bahadur Buddha Magar (‘Bikalpa’): YCL India coordina-
tor, then Maoist full-timer and district committee member, 
Rolpa, then district chairman, Rolpa 
Gam, Rolpa 
6 Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) politician, Rolpa Rolpa (VDC unknown) 
7 CPN-UML district chairman, Rolpa Jungar, Rolpa 
8 7 members of Maoist Martyr's Family Society Rolpa (various VDCs) 
9 Civil society activist, Rolpa Rolpa (VDC unknown) 
10 Teacher, higher secondary school in Liwang  Ghodagaun, Rolpa 
11 Peasant Liwang, Rolpa 
12 Teacher, lower secondary school in Kotgaun Dhawang, Rolpa 
13 Peasant, then Maoist part-time cadre Madichaur, Rolpa 
14 Shopkeeper/peasant  Kotgaun, Rolpa 
15 Congress politician/landowner, fled during the war Kotgaun, Rolpa 
16 Teacher, lower secondary school in Madichaur Tulsipur, Dang 
17 Peasant  Jankot, Rolpa 
18 Peasant Madichaur, Rolpa 
19 Student, then Maoist full-timer (PLA) Madichaur, Rolpa 
20 Peasant Madichaur, Rolpa 
21 Shopkeeper/peasant Madichaur, Rolpa 
22 Farmer/landowner Madichaur, Rolpa 
23 Laborer Madichaur, Rolpa 
24 Shopkeeper/peasant Madichaur, Rolpa 
25 Peasant Jankot, Rolpa 
26 Teacher, lower secondary school, Jankot Jankot, Rolpa 
27 Peasant Jankot, Rolpa 
28 Housewife Jankot, Rolpa 
29 Shopkeeper/peasant Jankot, Rolpa 
30 Peasant Madichaur, Rolpa 
31 Surender Thapa Gharti: Teacher; then Maoist full-timer (party 
wing), Rolpa 
Madichaur, Rolpa* 
32 Gulaf Magar: Student, then Maoist full-timer (PLA, then party 
wing), Rolpa 
Madichaur, Rolpa* 
33 Netra Bahadur Gharti (“Saddam”): Peasant and Maoist part-
timer, then Maoist full-timer (party wing) 
Jankot, Rolpa* 
* Phone interviews December 2011-January 2012 with follow-up phone interviews December 2012.   
For place of origin, the VDC name is given except for interviewees from Madichaur, who belong to Kotgaun or 
Jankot VDC. 
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Kalyvas’ Protocol for Coding Control 
Zone 1: Incumbent combatants permanently garrisoned in the village or within a one-hour radius; 
incumbent combatants and administrators operate freely during all times of day and night; no 
insurgent activity reported; insurgent clandestine organizations never set up or completely de-
stroyed. 
Zone 2: Incumbent combatants permanently garrisoned in the village or within a one-hour radius; 
incumbent combatants and administrators operate freely during all times of day and night; in-
surgent clandestine organizations operate inside the village; clandestine meetings take place; 
sporadic visits at night by insurgent combatants. 
Zone 3: Incumbent combatants permanently garrisoned in the village or within a one-hour radius, 
but do not move freely at night; incumbent administrators usually do not sleep in their homes; 
insurgent organizers are active; meetings take place regularly at night; regular visits by insur-
gent combatants at night. 
Zone 4: Insurgent combatant permanently garrisoned in the village or nearby; insurgent combat-
ants and administrators operate freely during all times of day and night; incumbent clandestine 
organizations operate inside village, and/or clandestine meetings take place, and/or sporadic 
visits by incumbent combatants. 
Zone 5: Insurgent combatants permanently garrisoned in the village or nearby; insurgent combat-
ants and administrators operate freely during all times of day and night; no incumbent activity 
reported; insurgent clandestine organizations never set up or completely destroyed.  
 
Note: Reproduced from Kalyvas (2006:421). 
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